

# **BRITISH FOREIGN RELATIONS: MARGARET THATCHER AND TONY BLAIR**

**de**

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## **MÁSTER EN ESTUDIOS INGLESES: APLICACIONES PROFESIONALES Y COMUNICACIÓN INTERCULTURAL 2011**

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# Subject Abstracts

## 1. Communication Strategies in English

The subject *Communication Strategies in English* was taught by Professors Dr. María Elena García Sánchez and Dr. Carmen María Bretones Callejas. It was part of the compulsory common subjects of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from October 1<sup>st</sup> to October 22<sup>nd</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To acquire the skills and techniques in order to communicate in English in a level B2/C (according to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages)
  - b) To improve oral and written skills in both academic and professional backgrounds.
- CONTENTS
  - 1. Writing Skills
    - English Grammar and Writing
    - Writing Paragraphs
    - Functions of Written English
    - Writing Essays, Reports, Letters and a Research Paper

1. Reading Skills

- Reading Techniques: From Skimming to Scanning
- Aim and Function of the Text
- Understanding Meaning
- Assessing the Text: Fact versus Opinion

2. Listening Skills: Developing Aural and Note-taking Skills

- Predicting
- Monitoring
- Clarifying

3. Speaking Skills

- Academic English: Discussion Skills for Tutorials & Seminars
- Discussion Skills: Giving your Opinion, Agreeing and Disagreeing, Making Suggestions...
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

The course was divided in two main blocks: Speaking & Writing and Listening & Reading.

M<sup>a</sup> Elena García introduced us to the spheres of Speaking and Academic Writing, focusing on the main differences of the two skills and providing us the tools to make an adequate use of them. A special emphasis was put on the teaching of these two abilities in a classroom context

Carmen Bretones was in charge of the block devoted to the study of the Reading and Listening. In order to do so, it was important to analyse thoroughly the components and elements that affect each of the skills. She offered a introduction to some theoretical issues in Cognitive Science and Cognitive Linguistics and their importance for Reading and Listening.

- ASSESSMENT

The block for Speaking and Academic writing was evaluated by means of an essay, and in order to complete the assessment of the second block we had to take a test.

## 2. Britain and US Cultures and Societies

The subject *Britain and US Cultures and Societies* was taught by Professors Dr. José Ramón Ibáñez Ibáñez and Dr. José Francisco Fernández Sánchez. It was part of the compulsory common subjects of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from October 1<sup>st</sup> to October 22<sup>nd</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES

- a) To increase concrete and specific knowledge about all the possible social and cultural aspects of these two countries: US and Great Britain.
- b) To be able to express an opinion in a reasonable way about the most recent events in the history of Britain and the U.S.
- c) To be able to interpret in a suitable context those recent events related to these countries.

- CONTENTS

1. Great Britain and the U.S. at the turn of the twentieth century.
    - Contemporary Britain: From Margaret Thatcher to David Cameron
    - Historical margins: From the Reagan Era to Barack Obama..
  2. Multicultural Britain. The American “melting pot”.
    - Multicultural Britain: Race and ethnicity
    - The American “Melting Pot”: Who shaped the US society over the last century.
  3. Domestic peculiarities: Emerging nationalities in Britain. The role of religion in America.
    - Identities and Nationalities: Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.
    - The Puritan heritage in the US: the unfathomable burden of religion in Modern America.
1. The external image of Britain and the US.
    - Mass media in Britain
    - US foreign policy

- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

It is essential in a Master's degree on English Studies to know the culture and society of two countries which have marked the developments of international issues in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries: Great Britain and the United States. There cannot be the slightest doubt that these two countries have a great social and cultural importance around the world and although students have a general knowledge of these countries, with the study of this subject, they will see aspects in detail such as politics, education, mass media, religion, recent history, etc. A course of this type will consolidate previous knowledge and it will increase the cultural knowledge about these two countries.

- ASSESSMENT

The subject was assessed by means of an exam about the contents studied in class. Furthermore, we had to write an essay about a chosen topic from a list given by the teacher (in my case it was "The Rise and Fall of Tony Blair"). Finally it was important to have an active participation in the classes through comments and interventions.

### **3. Oral Communication: Sociocultural, Linguistic and Psychological Factors**

The subject *Oral Communication: Sociocultural, Linguistic and Psychological factors* was taught by Professor Dr. Carmen María Bretones Callejas. It was part of the compulsory common subjects of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from October 23<sup>rd</sup> to November 14<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES

- a) To know what is oral communication.
- b) To acquire the skills in order to communicate in different professional contexts.
- c) To acquire the necessary skills for an efficient communication in English within an intercultural professional context.

- CONTENTS

1. Oral Communication

- Definition
- Innovative mechanism for the development of oral skills

2. Diacronic study of the different linguistic theories and methods for the teaching of oral English.

3. Sociocultural aspects of oral communication.

- Social sciences and the curriculum for second languages
- Study of oral communication in social context

4. Psychological perspectives for language learning

5. Social and cognitive dimension in oral communication

- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

Communication is one of the main reasons for the running of human societies. This communication is basically an interchange of messages among the individuals of that society. Human beings possess a brain structure that enables them to communicate not only in their mother tongue but also in different languages. Sociocultural, linguistic and psychological factors of oral



communication are extremely important in order to know everything what is in relation with human thought and to develop communicative abilities to reach success in professional, academic or personal spheres.

- ASSESSMENT

In order to evaluate this subject, we had to take an exam according to the contents previously studied in class.

#### 4. English as an Intercultural Vehicle: Literature and Society

The subject *English as an Intercultural Vehicle: Literature and Society* was taught by Professor Dr. Jesús Isaías Gómez López. It was part of the compulsory common subjects of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from October 23<sup>rd</sup> to November 14<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To focus on how literature is helpful to society.
  - b) To analyze how literary works show us various aspects from politics.
  - c) To analyze how literary works show us various aspects from economics.
  - d) To analyze how literary works show us various aspects from culture.
  - e) To give readers some knowledge of history.
- CONTENTS
  1. Analytical strategies.
  - “Sociological Turn”.
    1. Literature, culture and the canon.
  - Introduction to the major theories, trends and critics: Harold Bloom, Umberto Eco, Jung, etc.
    1. Forces and relations of productions.
  - Different ways of approaching literary canonical texts:
    - a. Sophistication.
    - b. Manipulation.
    - c. Affection.
    - d. Psychology.
    - e. Art.
    - f. Films.
  1. From modern society to “Brave New World”.
    - The fundamentals, sources and course of our Modern Western Civilization as seen in Brave New World: Prophecy of Human Fate?
  2. H. G. Wells: the principles of science fiction applied to society.
    - Literature and the latest technological and scientific discoveries through the last Twentieth century: H. G. Wells’ *The Time Machine*.

3. Novels into movies.

- Cases of the most celebrated literary works turned into movies:
  - James Joyce's *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*.
  - Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*.
  - Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*.
  - Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*.
  - H. G. Well's *The Time Machine*.

4. The aesthetics of poetry in society.

- Poetry is present everywhere in society. Because the poetry of a period has typical subjects and favored styles, it can serve as a marker of the tastes of its era:
  - T. S. Eliot's "*The Hollow Men*".
  - W. H. Auden's "*Spain*".
  - Elizabeth Bennet's.
  - Charles Bukowsky's "*The Genius of the Crowd*".
  - Aldous Huxley's "*Almeria*".

- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

The skeleton of the course is that of the sociology of literature, which emphasizes an external structural approach to the systematic study of the production and consumption of literature in society. To fill out the skeleton and thereby to introduce sociology through literature, the course includes the reading of several fictional works that exemplify issues raised in the sociology of literature. In addition, students' in-class writing assignments provide the means to "test" some ideas about authors, critics, literary styles, and the consumption of literature. The analysis of these texts encourages active learning by requiring students to play out the role of the sociologist of literature.

- ASSESSMENT

The assessment of this subject was focused on two types of essay, choosing one of them:

1) The first one consisted of choosing a major character from any novel and design an outfit and accessories. Students had to write an essay on their chosen hero according to the 12 steps of Joseph Campbell's "The Hero with a Thousand Faces".

2) The second one also dealt with an essay focusing on one of these two novels: "Brave New World" (Aldous Huxley) or "1984" (George Orwell). Students had to answer the following questions: "Is it better to be free than to be happy?" and "Is the collective more important than the individual?"

## 5. Research Techniques

The subject *Research Techniques* was taught by Professors Dr. María Elena García Sánchez and Dr. Carmen María Bretones Callejas. It was part of the compulsory common subjects of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from November 15<sup>th</sup> to December 10<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To acquire theoretical background about research methods
  - b) To develop practical abilities in order to search for bibliographical references, supplementary materials and data recompilation
  - c) To put into practice acquired knowledge about research
- CONTENTS
  - 1. The search for knowledge.
  - 2. Methodology.
  - 3. Typology of research methods
  - 4. Research techniques
  - 5. Creation of a theoretical framework in research
  - 6. Handling of sources.
  - 7. Data analysis.
  - 8. Concepts, protocols and structures of different academic text types for the elaboration of articles, reports, reviews, interviews, monographies and speeches.
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

This subject is closely connected with the increasing necessity of belonging to the present world of knowledge. The adequate use of information is an essential for both an academic and professional success. In order to do so, we were introduced to the different methods that can be used for research and how to analyse the obtained data.

Part of the subject was devoted to the online searching for information, working with sites such as Library of Congress (<http://catalog.loc.gov>) and Google Scholar (<http://scholar.google.es>).

Finally, we were introduced to the MLA style, which is an academic style guide widely used around the world that provides guidelines for writing and documentation of research in humanities, especially in English studies.

- ASSESSMENT

The assessment of this subject was based on two different tasks: Professor M<sup>a</sup> Elena García suggested an essay based on the book “Research Methods in Applied Linguistics” by Zoltán Dörnyei and Professor Carmen Bretones asked us to look for appropriate bibliographical references to be used in our Master Thesis, making use of the previously mentioned online sites and practicing with the conventions of the MLA Style.

## 6. Computer Appliances for English Teaching and Translation

The subject *Computer Appliances for English Teaching and Translation* was taught by Professor Dr. Nobel Augusto Perdú Honeyman. It was part of the compulsory common subjects of the Master degree. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from November 15<sup>th</sup> to December 10<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To use a memory-translation program:
  - b) To use appropriately the program “Hot potatoes”, in order to create teaching activities
  - c) To design a personal web site with useful teaching contents to be used by potential students
  - d) To command online and electronical profits.
- CONTENTS
  - 1. Hot Potatoes: operative working of the program for the design of exercises.
  - 2. Déjàvu: uses of the program and its memory translations.
  - 3. Other computer appliances for teaching and translating.
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

Professionals on English studies need to make use of an increasing number of computer appliances since they are a valuable tool for both teaching and translating.

This course was divided into three great blocks. The first one, was devoted to the program Déjàvu (a computer aided translation system) and we learnt how to use it, creating and joining memory translations.

The second block was devoted to the creation of a personal webpage. The site had to include resources for teaching English to our “potential learners”, with links to practice grammar, dictionaries, listening activities... and other aspects of anglo-saxon culture and educational fields.

The third block was aimed to “Hot Potatoes”, a software program that includes five applications that can create exercises for the World Wide Web. The applications are:

- JCloze
- JCross
- JMatch
- JMix
- JQuiz

There is also a sixth application called “The Masher” that compiles all the Hot Potatoes exercises into one unit. We were encouraged to add our personalized-Hot Potatoes exercises to our websites, achieving really positive results.

- ASSESSMENT

In order to be assessed, we had to complete three main tasks:

- a) Creation and proper use of memory translations with Déjàvu.
- b) Creation of a webpage with teaching resources.
- c) Design of five activities using the different applications of “Hot Potatoes”



## 7. Methods of Linguistic Research

The subject *Methods of Linguistic Research* was taught by Professor Dr. Jesús Gerardo Martínez Del Castillo. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from December 11<sup>th</sup> to January 22<sup>nd</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To understand and possess knowledge.
  - b) To acquire the ability to consider an opinion.
  - c) To acquire the ability to work in an autonomous way.
  - d) To learning ability.
  - e) To think critically.
  - f) To acquire the ability to set out problems.
  - g) To acquire the ability to reason.
- CONTENTS
  1. The naive approach of the problem.
  2. The epistemological question.
  3. The appropriate conditioning of the problem.
  4. The concept of logos.
  5. The basic approach of logos.
  6. Solutions to the logos problem from linguistics.
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

Linguistic research is the work of that person who wants to know about what to speak, to understand, to say and to know. It involves considering problems on what the activity of speaking is, an activity which speakers carry out in an autonomous way. The activity of speaking has three levels: universal, historical and individual. Each of these levels has different disciplines: language philosophy or general linguistics, linguistics of each language or historical linguistics and individual linguistics or text linguistics. Once we have specified the level and the purpose, we will have our own methods to define the linguistic fact as an object of science.

- ASSESSMENT

This subject was be assessed by a summary of the first six chapters of the book written by the teacher and entitled “The language-thought relationship”. In this summary, we set out that this relationship is always present in every linguistic theory and even that this is a problem speakers have to consider. This approach has to do with the Cognitive Sciences, and the term “cognition” is an object of study.

## 8. Methodology in English Language Teaching

The subject *Methodology in English Language Teaching* was taught by Professor Dr. María Sagrario Salaberri Ramiro. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from December 11<sup>th</sup> to January 22<sup>nd</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To apply theoretical knowledge and practical training to face learning situations.
  - b) To develop skills to plan didactic units.
  - c) To access to update information sources about regulations for the foreign languages curriculum in our context.
- CONTENTS
  1. Theory and methods for teaching English
    - Methodology and innovation
    - New trends
  2. Planning of didactic units
    - Planning a didactic unit
    - Selection of competences, learning objectives and contents.
    - Selection of activities and tasks for the individual and collective developments.
    - Criteria, procedures and tools for evaluation.
    - Attention to diversity
    - Promotion of learning autonomy
    - Use of ICT in the learning-teaching process.
  3. Evaluation of the learning-teaching process.
    - Teaching role in the evaluation of theoretical-practical learning of the acquired knowledge.
    - Promotion of self-evaluation for teachers and students.
    - Learning evaluation: methodology and tools, concepts, models and techniques for evaluation, research and innovation.
    - Use if ICT in the evaluation of the learning-teaching process.

- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

All the contents of the subject were focused towards the training of future teachers. In order to do so, we were given methods for the design of tasks, didactic units, teaching programmes, etc. We dealt with other concepts related to teaching, such as “multiple intelligences”, the “Portfolio”, the “learning competences”, all of this with the aim of making us aware that the teaching activity is a complex process where different aspects take place.

- ASSESSMENT

We were requested to prepare a teaching project (a task, a didactic unit, a lesson,...).The last day of the course, all the students of the group had to make a presentation of their projects.

Appart from that, we also had to design a “Reading Plan” in order to respond to the increasing awareness in relation to the encouragement of the “interest for reading and the ability to express oneself correctly”.

I designed a didactic unit addressed to students of the 4<sup>th</sup> year of Secondary Education. The didactic unit is called “British Life” and develops the main points that a unit should have, that is, didactic objectives, block of contents, methodology, key competences, attention to diversity and assessment criteria.

## 9. English for Specific Purposes

The subject *English for Specific Purposes* was taught by Professor Dr. María Soledad Cruz Martínez. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from January 28<sup>th</sup> to February 18<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To show students the research possibilities that are implied within the term “English for Specific purposes”.
  - b) To describe the main features of business English.
  - c) To describe the main features of Legal English.
  - d) To describe the main features of Academic English.
- CONTENTS
  1. ESP definition.
  2. Origin and development.
  3. Varieties.
  4. Register analysis as theoretical model in the description of academic and professional texts.
  5. Genre analysis as theoretical model in the description of academic and professional texts.
  6. Business English.
  7. Legal English.
  8. Academic English
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

This course offered a different perspective for the analysis of texts in English language, from both academic and professional spheres.

There are different paradigms that must be taken into account when we analyse any text. Some of them are:

- a) Structuralism: it focuses on the description of sentences and structures. According to structuralists language is seen as a system.
- b) Generativism: it focuses on the psychological component in language description. According to Robert de Beaugrande “Generativism can designate

an approach for relating language to the intuitive knowledge of speakers and to the mental capacities of humans at large."

c) Pragmatics: it studies the ways in which context contributes to meaning. According to pragmatics language has to be seen as discourse or text, and they also consider language as a crucial element for communication.

d) Cognitive Linguistics: it is the study of language in its cognitive function, where *cognitive* refers to the crucial role of intermediate informational structures with our encounters with the world as they assume that our interaction with the world is mediated through informational structures in the mind.

In the subject we focused on the perspectives of the register analysis (structuralism) and the genre analysis (pragmatics).

The professor combined theoretical explanations with practical activities done in the class, analysing texts from different perspectives.

- ASSESSMENT

For the evaluation of the subject, we were required to make an analysis of three different texts (one academic text and two professional ones) from the perspectives of genre and register.

## 10. Classroom Research: Theory and Practice

The subject *Classroom Research: Theory and Practice* was taught by Professor Dr. María Elena García Sánchez. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from January 28<sup>th</sup> to February 18<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  1. To acquire a researching attitude within the classroom.
  2. To improve our skills for teaching.
  3. To enable us to act in different teaching situations.
  4. To focus on motivation as a key factor for the teaching process.
- CONTENTS
  1. Classroom research
    - Action research
    - Data compilation: quantitative and qualitative research
  2. Reflective teaching
    - Teacher's thinking and students' thinking
    - Classroom observance
  3. Motivation in the FL classroom
    - Theories and paradigms in motivation
    - Study of sources of motivation
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

This course is a valuable tool for those teachers who want to reflect, analyze and research in the context of a FL classroom. It also values the importance of researching in the FL classroom in order to know the reality of the class-context and transforming it whenever necessary.

In traditional teaching methods, the focus of attention was the teacher, and little attention was put on the students. Nowadays the teacher is no longer the fount of all wisdom and student-centered approaches are gaining importance in the teaching field.

It is important to change and evolve, as it is clear that the antique teachers do not get as positives results as those who try to innovate and motivate his/her students. Some teachers see themselves as omniscient and are extremely critical of students. The result from this behaviour will be the students' dislike about the subject and a generalized lack of motivation.

Because of that, it is important that teachers reinvent themselves and their practice, as new methods and techniques can be really helpful in the FL classroom.

Reflective teaching, action research and motivation are three key factors in the success or failure of a good teacher, and because of that it will be extremely productive to make an appropriate use of them in our classrooms.

- ASSESSMENT

In order to be assessed, we were required to write a paper about three important elements that should impregnate the teaching practice. First, *reflecting teaching*, focusing on its principles and benefits in every kind of teaching situation. The second concept was *action research*, and I concentrated on the reasons to use it and even in the tools that we could make use of. Finally, we had to focus on *motivation*, paying special attention to the concept in relation to the foreign language classroom.



## 11. Linguistic and Cultural Analysis of English Press Advertising

The subject *Linguistic and Cultural Analysis of English Press Advertising* was taught by Professor Dr. María Enriqueta Cortés de los Ríos. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from February 19<sup>th</sup> to March 12<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To familiarize with the basic characteristics of advertising language in the press.
  - b) To analyze the linguistic and iconic aspects of advertising language.
  - c) To analyze cultural aspects through advertising.
- CONTENTS
  1. Definition, objectives and functions of advertising.
    - Definition of advertising.
    - Objectives of advertising.
    - Functions of advertising.
    - Information function.
    - Persuasion function.
    - Economic function.
    - Aesthetic function.
    - The AIDA Model.
  2. Syntax of advertising.
    - Sentence preferences.
  3. Appropriate characteristics of the verbal message and the advertising image.
    - Graphological features.
    - Phonological features.
    - Lexical features.
    - Pragmatic features.
    - Characteristics of the advertising image.
  4. Use of metaphors, metonymies and play on words in advertising.
    - Metaphor and Metonymy through Lakoff and Johnson's theory.
    - Play on words.

5. Cultural aspects in advertising.

- Characteristics of Culture.
- Cultural Dimensions in Advertising.
- Stereotypes.
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

Within the wide range of specific languages, the language of advertising is one of the most particular since it develops a conative, persuasive and form of address character. This subject presents linguistic (graphic-phonetic, morpho-syntactic and lexico-semantic), pragmatic and functional characteristics in English advertising. It also shows the characteristics of the text, the advertising image, the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy in advertisements. Finally, the subject deals with the cultural aspects in advertising.

- ASSESSMENT

The assessment of this subject has been carried out through the analysis of an advertising corpus in which students had to analyze the ads of the corpus following different methods.

## 12. Art, Literature and Mass Media in English Studies

The subject *Art, Literature and Mass Media* was taught by Professor Dr. Blasina Jesús Cantizano Márquez. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from February 19<sup>th</sup> to March 12<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) Acquisition and reinforcement of the English language within artistic fields.
  - b) Ability to analyze texts and other artistic manifestations.
  - c) Interpretation of the correlation and influence of the artistic expressions among them.
- CONTENTS
  1. Classical vs. contemporary art forms.
  2. The arts in English speaking countries.
  3. The romantic period.
    - Poetry: W. Wordsworth, S.T. Coleridge and W. Blake.
    - Narrative: E. A. Poe.
      1. The narrative experience: literature and film.
    - Point of view, place and time.
    - Authors: A. Proulx, R. Dahl.
      1. New experiments: literature and media.
- Bradford.
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

This subject was focused on the linguistic, artistic and humanistic cultural studies, which review the meaning of art in Great Britain and North America. It also covered the formation and ability in areas which answer new professional perspectives. A great part of the subject was devoted to train our abilities in order to criticize and analyze different artistic manifestations as in the case of cinema, literature, painting, music, etc.

- ASSESSMENT

The assessment of this subject was based on a research work of one the following themes on mass media:

- i. The television.
  - Show and entertainment.
  - As an educational tool.
- ii. Journals and magazines.
  - Journalism.
  - Sensationalism.
  - Literary magazines and periodicals.
- iii. Internet.
  - As mass media.
  - Social networks.

In my case I decided to research about the Internet. I presented a paper entitled “Social Networks”.

### 13. Landmarks in Contemporary British and American Literature

The subject *Landmarks in Contemporary British and American Literature* was taught by Professor Dr. José Ramón Ibáñez Ibáñez. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from March 18<sup>th</sup> to April 8<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES

- a) To understand the British and American cultural complexity of the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.
- b) To analyze key novels in the contemporary British and American literature.
- c) To give personal opinion from a literary point of view.
- d) To compare the texts reviewed in class with the film versions.
- e) To understand the present multicultural amalgam of the Anglo-Saxon societies and the huge impact of non-Anglo-Saxon authors in the social and literary scene of these countries.

- CONTENTS

1. The repressive role of the state: Anthony Burgess's "A Clockwork Orange" (1962).
2. The unstoppable consumerism of the 1980s. Martin Amis's "Money" (1984).
3. Dialectics of horror. Vonnegut's "Slaughterhouse-Five" (1969).
4. The American novel from Philip Roth to Don DeLillo.
5. Multicultural societies. East and West in Jhumpa Lahiri's "The Namesake" (2003).

- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

This subject involved an analysis of the British and American narrative from the 1960s to the present time through novels which show the complex cultural changes taking place in these countries in different periods. These works illustrate the cultural and social fragmentation of postmodernism, social alienation, the repressive role of the state outlined in Burgess's dystopian novel, the chaos caused by the Vietnam War according to Vonnegut's view and the reflect of the aggravated capitalism at the end of the twentieth century stated by Amis. Special emphasis will have the social multiculturalism of

Jhumpa Lahiri's work, unquestionable representation of the hybridization process occurred in the British and American societies. An important point is to take into account the perspective and the interpretation of film directors about the novels, and in order to do so we were offered the possibility of watching the film "A Clockwork Orange", directed by Stanley Kubrick in 1971 and also "The Namesake", directed by Mira Nair in 2006. The display of these two films originated very interesting discussions chaired by Professor Ibáñez.

- ASSESSMENT

It was necessary to read the four novels that were part of the programme and apart from that, the assessment of the subject took into consideration the participation in the different discussions about the films and the novels that originated in the classes. Even though, the most important factor was a final exam in which we were assessed in relation to the contents of the course.

#### 14. Cultural Studies: Narrative, Identity and Gender

The subject *Cultural Studies: Narrative, Identity and Gender* was taught by Professor Dr. María Elena Jaime de Pablos. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from March 18<sup>th</sup> to April 8<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To increase student knowledge about the different social roles of women and men cross-culturally
  - b) To understand the different expectations and experiences of different gender roles in diverse societies
- CONTENTS
  - 1. The construction of gender in literature.
  - 2. Feminine identity in autobiographical narrative.
  - 3. Inverted feminine myths in feminist literature.
  - 4. Discursive strategies of feminine characters in texts from contemporary female writers.
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

When dealing with the question of gender it is important to have a vision about the feminist literary theory. The basic objective of this theory is to criticize the marginal situation of women and their consideration as inferior to men.

Gender has to become a visible category of analysis as it has been considered invisible for traditional approaches.

In order to do so we find that:

- canons must be revised
- women must be included in canons
- texts must be revisited
- differences that originate discrimination must be spotted in order to subvert them

To study the concepts of narrative, gender and identity, we focused in the study of two outstanding novels: *A Room of One's Own*, by Virginia Woolf and *The Color Purple*, by Alice Walker.

In *A Room of One's Own*, the narrator emphasizes the fact that women are treated unequally in her society and that this is why they have produced less impressive works of writing than men. To illustrate her point, the narrator creates a woman named Judith Shakespeare, the imaginary twin sister of William Shakespeare. The narrator uses Judith to show how society systematically discriminates against women.

In *The Color Purple*, we could see the oppression that Black women have experienced throughout history in the rural South in America. Following the Civil War, most Black Americans were typically viewed as less than human by many members of white society. Women were also regarded as less important than men—both Black and white—making Black women doubly disadvantaged. Black women of the era were often treated as slaves or as property, even by male members of their own families.

The subject is a valuable tool to make an approach to feminist literary theory by means of:

- Denaturalizing the subordination of woman within the family.
- Disclosing the sexual myths of feminine passivity.
- Erasing normative heterosexuality.
- Focusing on literary canons to include woman
- Studying relation between gender and genre
- ASSESSMENT

In order to be assessed, we had to write an essay about “Identity and gender” on one of the two novels previously mentioned. I chose writing about “A room of one's own”, by Virginia Woolf.



## 15. New Trends in the Literature of the English Language

The subject *New Trends in the Literature of the English Language* was taught by Professor Dr. José Carlos Redondo Olmedilla. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from April 29<sup>th</sup> to May 14<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES

- a) To know the main movements, authors and literary trends in the English language in our present time (twentieth and twenty-first centuries).

- b) To analyze from a critical and contextual point of view, certain meaningful and relevant texts within the well-proportioned teacher-learner frame.

- c) To acquire basic instrumental techniques related to the textual environment.

- d) To acquire other techniques which involve a greater knowledge when we deal with texts, their critical interpretation, their ideological and aesthetic expression.

- CONTENTS

1. Social and cultural historical context of the new society. Written literature in the English language.

2. African literature written in English: Wole Soyinka, J. M. Coetzee.

3. Indian and Caribbean literature written in English: A. K. Ramanujan, Derek Walcott.

4. Australian literature written in English: Les Murray, new Australian writing.

5. Canadian literature written in English: Alice Munro, Dione Brand, new Canadian writing.

6. Hybridization, globalization and literary production in the English language.

7. Market and art in the new literary production in the English language.

- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

One of the main points of this subject is to provide students with the most relevant authors and literary productions within the chronological and historical period that covers the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries (periods, movements, genres and authors) and the methodology of the textual analysis applied to texts within the new trends in the English language.

Although the core topic of the course was “literature” our entire lessons took place in a computers lab, where we could easily have access to every imaginable kind of information: texts, images, historical facts, etc.

- ASSESSMENT

The very fast pace of the lessons was maybe the reason for their success: working interactively with the computers made the content really interesting and consequently the attendance to the lessons was essential to know the content of the subject. The final assessment consisted on a summary about what we studied during the course, that's to say, about the new trends in the literature of the English language, focusing on three main places: South Africa, the Caribbean, Canada and Australia.

## 16. Other Cultures in English Speaking Countries

The subject *Other Cultures in English Speaking Countries* was taught by Professor Dr. José Francisco Fernández Sánchez. It was part of the compulsory subjects for Itinerary 2 (Research and Teaching) of the Master in English Studies. There were seven lessons devoted to the study of this course (3 ECTS credits) that took place from April 29<sup>th</sup> to May 14<sup>th</sup>. The structure of the subject was as follows:

- OBJECTIVES
  - a) To analyze the different cultures which form the Anglo-Saxon world and the English speaking countries
  - b) To prove the variety of practices, ideologies, social and political systems which shape postcolonial societies nowadays.
  - c) To value the identity and cultural diversity of these three countries: Ireland, South Africa and Australia,.
  - d) To analyze critically going beyond national and linguistic barriers.
- CONTENTS
  1. Contemporary Ireland.
    - Recent History. From Autarchy to the “Celtic Tiger”.
    - Cultural and identity issues.
  2. South African history and society
    - South African recent past.
    - Conflicts and hopes for the future.
  3. Modern Australia.
    - Australia’s troubled past.
    - Postcolonial approaches to Australian society.
- ANALYSIS OF THE SUBJECT

This subject was considered an essential complement in this Master’s degree, especially in what concerns to the global view in a world in continuous movement. The recent processes of decolonization and globalization in our present history have stated that the developing countries have an important role in our world-wide scene. The new multicultural societies in Europe and America, or the new hallmarks of the emerging countries oblige us to think in a different

way and to reconsider old territorial plans. This subject also examined the present situation of a group of former British colonies and gives a rich perspective of what we know as “English Studies”.

The course was designed combining both theory and practice, that's to say: first we had a master class which included the theoretical and historical framework and then we watched a film from that country that contained the elements previously studied. The film selected to represent Ireland was “The Snapper” (1993), a film about a 20 year old girl living with her parents and many brothers who gets herself pregnant and refuses to name the father. In order to portray the contents related to Australia, we watched the homonymous film “Australia” (2008). This film includes many symbols of the country, such as the relation with the mother land, the prototypical image of the Australian man, the cattle, the drover, etc. Finally, South Africa was pictured through the film “Disgrace” (2008), in which we had a vision of post-apartheid politics.

- ASSESSMENT

The assessment of this subject consisted of an analysis of the three countries studied during the course, Ireland, Australia and South Africa, watching three films which will try to reflect the present moment of these countries, the changes produced in their history and the evolution suffered until they became independent nations. This will lead us to understand in a better way their recent situations and their cultural diversity.

# Research Paper

## **FOREIGN RELATIONS: MARGARET THATCHER AND TONY BLAIR**

### **1. INTRODUCTION.**

#### **Aims**

Among the different British Prime Ministers who ruled Britain during the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries, there are two of them who lived through the most important periods and changes in the contemporary history of their country. These two British leaders are Margaret Thatcher, who governed the U.K. from 1979 to 1990, and Tony Blair, British Premier from 1997 to 2007.

This research is devoted to the study of both Prime Ministers in relation to their foreign policies during their time in office. Having this aim in mind, I will analyze the “special relationship” with the United States of America and the way they acted as regards important events from an international perspective.

On the one hand, the 1980s began with a deep economic recession and Margaret Thatcher carried out important reforms and cuts in public spending which were heavily contested. She maintained a strained relationship with Europe. Her complete resistance to enter the European Economic Community, above all due to matters related to national sovereignty, distanced Britain from the rest of the European countries. Despite her reluctance to a closer relation with the continent, Thatcher had an active participation in the collapse of Communism and the fall of the Berlin wall. Thatcher's total opposition to

Communism and her closeness towards Mikhail Gorbachev made her play an essential role in the new vision of Europe and the world, circumstances which marked the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.

On the other hand, Britain was America's main and most loyal ally. Thatcher considered that Britain should be a staunch defender of U.S. policies, but that implied a complete subjugation to the American superpower. This meant certain advantages too as was the case of the American support to Britain in the Falklands war. But what Thatcher had in mind was the recovery of the past glory of Britain, to put the U.K. in the first line of the world order and maintain the same political and economic status as her partner at the other side of the Atlantic. This idea was followed by the other British leader, Tony Blair, who developed the same set of values during his ten years of government.

Tony Blair will be remembered by his charm and his capacity to attract people's attention but also by the Iraq conflict.

After seventeen years of Conservative governments, he was expected to be the leader of a New Labour party, a renewed organization and with fresh ideas. Unlike Thatcher, Blair maintained a better relationship with Europe. He was very successful as regards European policies, but the refusal to enter in the Eurozone marked the point of no return for Britain, which intended not to yield certain powers.

During Blair's time, the "special relationship" with the US went through two different periods. The first one was marked by a close relationship with Bill Clinton, a leader who shared with Blair Third Way ideas. Blair was of great support when the U.S. president was involved in certain "non-political affairs" and in the first attack to Iraq in 1998. Clinton helped Blair to find a solution in the Kosovo war, although he kept certain doubts at the beginning of the process.

In the second period, the "special relationship" was marked by the Iraq conflict in 2003 and by the leadership of George W. Bush. This conflict would define the fall of Tony Blair and the negative image he left on most of the citizens of Britain. The citizens' refusal to the war and the internal conflicts in the Labour party precipitated his resignation. Blair's support for America and Bush's

unilateralist policy, in the name of democracy and humanitarian causes, was taken for granted by the American president, but not by the rest of the world and this was his biggest failure. Unfortunately, this action will probably be his most remarkable feature when historians write about him.

### **Key words**

Another important aspect to consider when we talk about Foreign Policy is its definition. The government of a country usually makes important decisions according to their national interests and taking into account international power relations. This is called Foreign Policy.

When we talk about foreign policy, we have to bear in mind that any single country must be thought of as an essential actor in the international arena. The world order could even be compared with a play, in which the different countries play the role of actors, the stage is the world scene and the plot and subsequent events are the decisions and performances that the actors (countries) have to carry out. This implies a complex game of power, but an unavoidable one.

Although we know the quantity and the diversity of actors who interact in the international order, we have to consider other actions and other type of actors, that is, the role of the countries in certain organizations, the networks of crime which act as an unleashed factor of certain events in countries which suffer them and terrorists groups. All these factors are elements at play in politics in many countries nowadays.

Furthermore, we have to take into account that the foreign policy in a country is directly related to its domestic affairs. International relationships and public policy are closely linked. Foreign affairs are nourished by diplomacy, they are affected by possible conflicts inside or outside the country and by the application of economic sanctions. It is thus important to understand the political context in which certain policies are developed, particularly in times of social unrest or economic crisis.

Foreign relations are deemed essential not only in the present time, but they have always played an important part in the history of the world. Foreign relations determine economic initiative and strengthen or diminish the image of

each country. Foreign affairs determine the good or bad position that any country can have among its peers. Foreign policy could even define the eventual participation in a conflict. Foreign relations must be one of the key points of any country's identity and the way to develop certain relations should be taken into account to maintain prosperity and peace as necessary elements for a peaceful coexistence.

## **Methodology**

As regards the methodology used for the elaboration of this project, I have grounded my research in the work of different authors, journalists and historians who are experts in the field of British foreign affairs. Political analysts like the ones I mention along the following pages have been of great help for scholars and the general public in order to weigh up the different points of view in critical moments of both British Prime Ministers during their term in office. Experts in economic affairs have processed the information on the relation between Europe and the U.K. in economic matters, above all during the Thatcher period, and I have also turned to their analyses when I had to face a complex issue.

I have chosen three important authors who have devoted their efforts to the study of contemporary policies in the U.K. and the U.S. The first author is Anthony Seldon. He is a political commentator and Tony Blair's biographer. He has served as headmaster in some British colleges and currently he is master of Wellington College.

Anthony Seldon is best known for his writings about Tony Blair, *The Blair Effect* (1997-2001 and 2001-2005) and *Blair* (2005), both of them authoritative works. He is a columnist in a number of newspapers and he has published relevant books about Thatcher, *Britain under Thatcher* (1999), or John Major, *Major, A Political Life* (1998). He also founded with Peter Hennessy the Institute of Contemporary British History, organizing annual education conferences for state and independent schools.

The second author is Hugo Young, a British journalist, columnist and political commentator at *The Guardian*. He is considered one of the most important and influential figures in modern British journalism. Young was a strong supporter of



European integration and expressed his disappointment with the British government's eurosceptic politics. He also criticised Blair's decision to side with George Bush in the invasion of Iraq. He wrote a critical biography of Margaret Thatcher, *One of Us* (1989). He also wrote *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (1998).

The third author is Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services Institute. He was Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College from 1990 to 2001. In 2004 he was appointed the U.K. member of the United Nations Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and in 2007 he was appointed as one of the Security Commissioners at the Institute for Public Policy Research. He has published some articles on defence and security policy. One of them is called "Foreign Policy", a chapter included in Anthony Seldon's book *Blair's Britain, 1997-2007*, (2007).

## **2. MARGARET THATCHER'S FOREIGN POLICY.**

There was once upon a time when Great Britain ruled the seas and the sun never set on the British Empire, a time when Britain was the superior world power. But this empire began to collapse at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Yet in the twentieth century, British foreign policy has been characterized by a continuous and careful balancing of overseas interests and European commitments but with the U.S. as the central core of those interests. The term "special relationship" refers to the link the U.S. and Britain share, with a common language and heritage. The peoples and the history of the United States are linked together with the history of Great Britain. This "special relationship" started in the twentieth century as the two countries learned to act in concert when two world wars ripped the globe. Throughout the twentieth century, their mutual defense of democracy brought them together.

The term itself was coined during WWII. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used the phrase in private correspondence in 1943. Churchill and American President Franklin Roosevelt had cultivated this relationship during WWII, but the British Prime Minister was unwilling to dismantle the ancient empire and Roosevelt was sceptical of that empire. After the war, Britain

emerged triumphant, but perhaps not with the usual elation that accompanies such victory. America, on the other hand, emerged not only victorious but also as the new world power usurping Britain's time honored title. Britain became a ghost of its former glory. As a result, Britain could never be as important to the Americans as America was to the British.

When we talk about that "special relationship", it is inevitable to think about the Margaret Thatcher-Ronald Reagan axis. Thatcher wished to make Britain great again and her relationship with Reagan was perfect to achieve her goal. The Thatcher-Reagan axis was developed in the 1980s, with an ideology in common, the New Right. The domestic and foreign policies pursued by them have to do with the ideas and doctrines of the New Right which could be defined as follows.

### **2.1 The New Right in the 80s and 90s**

The origins of the New Right go back to the 1950s. It was centered around libertarians, traditionalists and anti-communists ideas. In the 80s, it embraced "fusionism", that is, classical liberal economies and traditional social values. These ideas were welcomed by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and their governments were defined by them during their leadership. The New Right looked for market transformation around the world. But we find certain contradictions in the concept of New Right. "Por un lado elimina la tradición como consecuencia del impulso de las fuerzas de Mercado, pero por otro lado se vincula con el conservadurismo en la persistencia de la tradición en las áreas de la nación, la religión, los sexos y la familia" (Sanmartín 2003: 39).

In the U.S. the absence of a Socialist party would favour the arrival of Capitalism with the Conservative party. The New Right has a special devotion to capitalism.

As we said before, the New Right has its origins after WWII, with key texts such as *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), by Friedrich Hayek. The appearance of this thought represented a reaction against the English Labour party and the American New Deal, a theoretical and political opposition against the welfare and interventionist state. The New Right considers the market as

the centre of modern civilization and it believes in economic individualism. The New Right fosters property as a way to guarantee the participation in the market system. The main ideas of this current are (Sanmartín 2003: 40):

- “El actor principal en la sociedad es el individuo. La maximización del bienestar individual es la fuerza conductora de la economía.”
- “El mercado libre es el sistema más fiable y flexible para regular la oferta y la demanda a través del mecanismo de precios.”
- “El progreso se puede producir por medio de la dinámica del esfuerzo individual, la competencia y la actividad empresarial.”

### **2.1.1 The New Right in the U.S.**

In the U.S. the concept of New Right represents the political conservatism and the economic liberalism until the very end. We have to bear in mind that the concept “liberal” has two different meanings in the U.S. On one hand in the political scene, Liberals are those who ask for a greater intervention of the state. On the other, in the economic scene, Liberals are those who defend free market.

The New Right is based on cutting taxes, an increase in defence expense, reduction in ecological restraints and minimizing of the competence in the governmental activity. With Ronald Reagan, the New Right tried to reorganize the economy, restricting the Central Administration powers in order to favour free market laws. Suddenly, Keynesianism was not able to solve the economic and social problems, contributing to inflation and with no solutions for stagflation.

The Reagan administration tried to recover its most aggressive side (specially in Latin America) under the concept of “National Interest”. This concept consists of the use of force in military actions, political negotiation and economic cooperation with developing countries. The U.S. government considered necessary to revert what they perceived as an expansion of the Soviet influence in the Third world and more precisely in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Nicaragua and Cuba.

The Reagan Doctrine considered that American support to anti-Marxist troops would stop the Soviet expansion and would decelerate the revolution. Certain authors claim that this doctrine destroyed the international order, since it supported universal concepts such as individual freedom and democratic systems of government as guides for a world which was not willing to accept certain liberal ideologies.

Another important point in the Reagan administration was the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) one of the most important examples of his political system, created to fight against Soviet missiles. In his last term, Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed some treaties to reduce the use of nuclear arms between the two nations.

### **2.1.2 The New Right in Britain**

The New Right in Britain with Margaret Thatcher as its loyal follower, had the intention to apply a tax cuts plan and a budget increase in defense, law and order. Thatcher defended the independence of the individual, a non-interventionist state, cuts in public expenditure and monetarism. It was an attempt to impose a necessary economic modernization and an effort to remodel British institutions according to the lines of an unrecoverable past.

Thatcher's government was not a political plan with a specific ideology as a central core. It started as a local answer to a British problem. The traditional running of the British economy based on the coordination of government, employers and unions were not the tool to create wealth and a guarantee of social cohesion in that moment. There began to appear industrial conflicts and discrepancies regarding the distribution of national income. This perception of the situation in Britain during the 1980s was called "Thatcherism".

Thatcher's foreign policy was marked by the facilities she gave for the independence of Rhodesia, the Falklands war and her support to the end of the Cold War and her excellent relationships with Reagan and Gorbachev.

## **2.2 Foreign Affairs**

When we consider the differences between domestic and foreign policies, we also have to consider the flexibility of the leader, his or her views of the world and of their own country and, even, their subordinates and the support they obtained from them in certain moments. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher won the elections and became the first woman as British Prime Minister. Her most immediate concerns were Britain and only Britain: "Foreign affairs are the least visible preoccupation of a prime minister's life" (Young 1989: 247). And that is true. In the case of Thatcher, she was not so worried about foreign affairs. Britain was suffering a deep crisis and she had great plans for its recovery. She was not a flexible leader to face foreign affairs. Her insularity and close-minded ideas did not define her as a perfect diplomat, even with her subordinates in the Foreign Office. Different journeys in 1981 to Washington, the Netherlands, India and other countries did not open her mind, although it was an initial contact with international affairs. A case which could explain her manners would be that of a visit to the Gulf. It was a sales trip, dealing with missiles and tanks to be bought by Oman and Qatar. She insisted on extending her visit beyond the time planned by the Foreign Office.

The public side of this trip was a success. She had an excellent performance in different meetings with the various heads of state. But her private behaviour was problematic. She mistreated her embassy officials and their wives publicly, telling them that they had not done things the way she expected. She also lacked diplomatic discretion when her Foreign Office Minister cautioned her not to make an exaggerated speech about a Gulf leader who had amassed an illicit personal fortune. The British premier was advised by the Foreign Office to moderate her enthusiasm and she complained about it.

One of the most vivid and important demonstrations of a special relationship can be found during the Thatcher and Reagan era. Before the arrival of Thatcher at the British government, the relationship with the U.S. was not so close. Edward Heath, the last Conservative Prime Minister, fostered a closer relationship with Europe, but Thatcher was not willing to follow this policy. In the years to come, Britain would struggle to find its place on the world stage and at crucial periods, it would look across the Atlantic hoping to call upon that special relationship.

Reagan's presidency fell entirely within Margaret Thatcher's term as prime minister. "Each admired the other's country, they were personally close" (Hopkins and Young 2005: 509). Both shared a mutual admiration not only for each other, but also for the other's conservative ideology. The two were fierce anti-communists and strong proponents of free market economies. For Reagan and Thatcher their main mantra seemed to be capitalism and privatization.

Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan first met in London in 1975. Thatcher had recently been elected Conservative leader and Reagan had finished his second term as governor of California. In this first meeting, the president defined her in these terms: "she was extremely well-informed, but she was firm, decisive and she had targets in mind of where we should be going. I was just greatly impressed" (Young 1989: 250). Reagan remembered feeling an instant connection to Thatcher. Thatcher felt the same in their first meeting, considering Reagan someone who felt and thought as she did. This meeting signaled the beginning of a lifelong friendship and political alliance. Previous instances of outstanding relationships were those between Winston Churchill and F.D. Roosevelt or a brief one between Harold Macmillan with John Kennedy. But the Thatcher-Reagan relationship was unique. "This political love affair had given the impression that America was a higher priority than Europe in the eyes of the British leadership and that Britain has on the whole been over-anxious to parade loyalty to the U.S." (Parsons 1991:161). This support could be seen in the different moments in which each leader needed each other, except that of the invasion of Grenada.

### **2.2.1 Afghanistan (1979-1989).**

The Soviet war in Afghanistan was a conflict lasting nine years which involved the Soviet Union supporting the Marxist-Leninist government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan against the Afghan Mujahideen and Arab-Afghan volunteers. The mujahideen got military and financial support from the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Jimmy Carter, the president of the U.S. at the beginning of the conflict expressed his worry about the USSR gaining access to the Indian Ocean.

In 1981, after the election of U.S. President Ronald Reagan the aid to the mujahideen increased. Britain and the U.S. along with Pakistan and Saudi

Arabia joined in the task to train, finance and supply the guerrillas with arms to the mujahideen and to foster young Arab activists to fight in Afghanistan for the cause. There were sown the seeds of future conflicts and wars. "Britain sent special forces from the Special Air Service (SAS) to Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the Afghan guerrillas. Afghan soldiers were sent to Britain to receive military instruction" (Halliday 1999:232). A Scottish valley was used, due to its resemblance to certain Afghan areas, to train activists to bring down Soviet helicopters. This conflict involved the growth of Islamic terrorism in the future and a great impact in the international scene.

The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and his "new thinking" was the most important factor in the Soviet Union's decision to leave. Gorbachev reformed the Soviet Union's economy and image throughout the world with his foreign policy of "openness". The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987 with the U.S. and the withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan improved the Soviet Union's image around the world.

### **2.2.2 The Falklands War (2<sup>nd</sup> April 1982-14<sup>th</sup> June 1982).**

The Falklands war was the greatest conflict which put to the test the "special relationship" between Britain and the U.S. since the Suez Crisis of 1956. "Paradoxically, this failure of diplomacy to prevent war resulted in a major boost for British international prestige"(Parsons 1991:157). Thatcher could have lost much if the war had ended in disaster. Her indifference and indecision as regards the Argentinian threat, guaranteed a war which could have been avoided. She risked national pride, her future electability in the Conservative party, her premiership and the "special relationship" with the US.

The Falkland Islands were a relic of the British Empire. The British had been in control of the Falklands since 1833. They were not the only people who claimed the islands. Successive Argentine governments had been competing to obtain the control of the islands. Different negotiations between both governments never reached a successful end. The British neglected the negotiations during those years, using the excuses of the islanders who wished to remain under British rule. "Neither the islanders felt threatened by any crime nor deportations by the Argentinian government" (Halliday 1999:240).

In 1982 a new military Junta, under General Galtieri, ran Argentina. This country had a different concept from that of the British about the islands. The Argentinian government considered that they did not have any economic or military importance for the British.

Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office made two visits to the South Atlantic to resolve the problem. "He proposed a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, with an immediate long-term lease-back to Britain"(Young 1989: 259). Foreign Secretary Carrington considered Ridley scheme "right but rash". Thatcher was concerned with the decolonization of Rhodesia and the Falklands were not of extreme preoccupation, so she moved away from the process.

The problem got worse when Britain withdrew the ship HMS *Endurance* from the Falklands coast. This act was a proof that the British were abandoning the Falklands. The withdrawal of the *Endurance* was a part of a series of defence cuts focused on trimming Britain's Royal Navy. The ship's removal had been a topic of discussion for nearly five years, and in 1982, Thatcher and Defense Secretary John Nott agreed to get rid of the ship guarding the Falkland Islands. This removal was not seen by the Argentine press as an only cost cutting measure, but rather as an indicator that Britain had lost interest in the South Atlantic and the islands. This decision meant that the islands would be defenseless, as Thatcher did not plan to fortify them. Furthermore, Thatcher backed away from reaching an agreement with Argentina over the Falklands' sovereignty dispute. The Argentine government was continuing to accumulate military power. The Foreign Office urged the Prime Minister to transfer sovereignty of the islands through leaseback or risk the threat of invasion. But Thatcher continued to maintain her initial position. It was a grave mistake. Once the islands were invaded, the British premier was determined to find a solution by all means.

Britain was unprepared militarily to retrieve the Falklands. If Thatcher wanted the islands back she needed U.S. support. It would be the first major test of the "special relationship" she had worked hard to cultivate between herself and Reagan. At first she asked Reagan to dissuade Galtieri from attempting an assault the day before the invasion took place. Reagan tried to help her but Galtieri was determined to continue with his position. The Falklands



was a difficult question for Reagan. Argentina was an American ally, a valued ally. The U.S. president wanted to halt Communism in South America and Argentina's new government was a vital ally to do it. However, he was equally conscious of the importance of America's relationship with Britain. Although Reagan did not make his intentions clear, he had been privately providing Britain with as much assistance as possible. The aid consisted of transport aircraft, Sidewinder missiles and collaboration on signals and intelligence that was very important for a final victory. His assistance to Britain was only to fortify their relationship, a relationship Britain needed and America did not. Reagan's unsteady attitude created a nervous tension between himself and Thatcher.

The outcome of the war was the death of 255 British and 649 Argentine soldiers but, above all, it meant that Thatcher's triumph assured her a second term in office, something which was not so assured at the beginning of the war. She also escaped an embarrassing failure by following her transatlantic instincts.

### **2.2.3 Grenada (1983).**

Grenada is a small island in the Caribbean and also member of the British Commonwealth. The island had been ruled for some years by a Marxist regime, cooperating with Cuba and the USSR on trade and foreign policy, but with a "non-aligned" status.

On October 1983, the Marxist leader Maurice Bishop was murdered by a more left-wing faction. The alert rose with the change from a moderate government to a pro-Communist one. One thousand American people lived in Grenada and, it was thought that their lives were at risk. The U.S. and other Caribbean countries feared the possible contagion of Communist regimes, so an invasion was decided. Reagan's justification for invading the island was based on the protection of the American population in the island, the prevention of chaos and the restoration of law and order. Thatcher was firmly against the invasion but she could do nothing to stop America.

The president of the U.S. had not informed Thatcher of the invasion until after signing the order. Even then, a cabinet committee, presided by the British premier, decided to turn down any British military intervention. Thatcher

reminded Reagan that Grenada had a Commonwealth status. But this was not Thatcher's only concern. She was also concerned about the implication this intervention would have for Afghanistan. "It would be strange to condemn the Soviets for invading Afghanistan after Reagan did the same with Grenada"(Halliday 1999: 215).

Thatcher felt embarrassed and betrayed but after America's support in the Falklands, London had a favour to grant. The invasion success meant a relief for Thatcher, even when she did not agree on the method followed by America. If Reagan's invasion of Grenada had failed, it would have been disastrous for Anglo-American relations. But the successful end allowed tensions to cool in the following months. But what this intervention proved was that Reagan was a president of a superpower nation and he did not need the permission of any Prime Minister to act alone against any dangerous action for his country.

#### **2.2.4 Libya (1986).**

Since the 1980s, Col. Gadafi's regime had provoked enmity to American and British administrations due to Libya's support to terrorist groups. "El 5 de abril de 1986 una bomba explota en una discoteca de Berlín, muriendo un soldado norteamericano. Tras este hecho, Reagan informa a la Primera Ministra británica de un ataque inminente a Libia" (Navarro 2009).

The bombers, placed in Britain, were deployed along the Libyan coast. Although Thatcher gave her approval, she proposed that only very particular targets, linked with terrorists, should be bombed and the number of civilian casualties should be as few as possible. This decision was decided among the smallest group of ministers. Among them were Geoffrey Howe, George Younger and William Whitelaw. All of them had certain reluctances. Even Whitelaw marked a difference between the request of an ally and the support on every action this ally proposed. But all of them knew that Reagan's requests could not be refused.

"The bombing was extraordinarily unpopular. Even the most faithful Conservative columnists withheld their support". Certain Conservative newspapers ridiculed what Thatcher considered "carefully selected targets"(Young 1989: 477).

The U.S. praised her loyalty and support. Although with a resulting success in the operation, she had certain fears. Thatcher was afraid of possible reprisals towards British people who lived abroad but nothing happened. Libyan terrorism was reduced. This new support to America strengthened her ideas and her self-belief. Finally, U.S. action along with Britain consolidated their “special relationship”, but Thatcher knew that her most faithful partner would act alone, whatever she might think.

### **2.2.5 Europe.**

In the 1960s the trend towards a change from the “special relationship” with the U.S. to a European approach took place. But it is possible that this change of viewpoint was considered belated and Britain did not realize that the EEC was the wave of the future. The idea of dependence on Europe and a possible loss in their sovereign rights and institutions were one of the reasons of their resistance to enter the European Economic Community. However, this behaviour was a complete mistake. In the 1960s, Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan preferred to strengthen the “special relationship”, subjugating Britain to the Americans. He tried to entry into the EEC due to the fact that the United States had a favourable vision towards Europe, but France vetoed British entry and it was postponed to a future.

The key date was 1973. Europe started to experience a renewal in its economy and politics, with Germany as the central core. There was a resurgence of wealth and power in Europe, whereas Britain and America were struggling against an important crisis. The fact that Germany was exceeding in manufactured goods to America meant that Germany was becoming an important ally for the U.S. Somehow the “special relationship” was losing its importance. But in 1973 Great Britain entered the EEC thanks to the great efforts of Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath. With Heath the “special relationship” got cold and the relationship with Europe lived its closest period. Heath emphasized the economic benefits of this union for the Parliament and the British people. With the entry as a member in the European Economic Community, the British would enjoy a higher standard of living. It would lead to independence for Britain, to talk in equal terms among the rest of European countries, not a relationship based on dependence on another superpower.

But with Margaret Thatcher's arrival at the British premiership, Heath's achievements in Europe were in deadlock. It is well-known Thatcher's aversion to Europe. She led a deep British nationalism, assuring that the EEC role was to guarantee the commercial exchange without objections and the free circulation of goods and people. She fought tooth and nail to defend British symbols as the Pound Sterling and she feared that the European Common Market evolved and assumed competences with too much power. The British tradition of a powerful Parliament is closely associated with national power and in many cases, MPs are resistant to transfer their power to European Community institutions. The revival of Britain was her main concern.

The British premier was inclined to favour the "special relationship" than to approach an emerging Europe, although this meant the transfer of some power to Brussels. Since the beginning of her term, it was clear that she was not like her predecessor, Heath. "She did not move towards a united Europe, instead, she wanted to have as little connection with the continent as possible"(Parsons 1991: 156).

In a way, Europe was strange for Thatcher. It was a foreign, socialist in many countries, and fragmented continent. "She was criticized for her views on Europe, where she was frequently at odds with other European Community leaders" (McCormick 2007: 26). She always felt a close connection with North America and, at the same time, she always felt away from Europe. One of the reasons of that behaviour could be explained in terms of influence and the memory of a past glory. Her desire for influence was clear in her relationship with the U.S. but it was not so clear for the American president. Reagan could be influenced up to a certain degree and her influence over Reagan was limited as we have seen in previous points.

Britain is often described as the awkward partner of the European Community. The "special relationship" marked this rift with Europe and most British Prime Ministers have not done their best to improve the relationship. In a way, Britain feared to lose their sovereignty if its policies were closer to the EEC.

Thatcher's rejections were based on new reforms which had the intention to provide the EEC with a federal structure and a greater centralization of the decision-making to the detriment of central governments of each country

member. So, a possible cooperation with Europe was almost impossible in this respect. In the first meeting of the European Council in June 1979, the British leader did not present her future prejudices. The discussion of budgetary contributions was brief. But in a second meeting in Dublin in that same year, the discussion became quite heated. It was proposed that the 1975 rebate would be modified to give Britain a cash rebate of 350 million Pounds. Thatcher insisted that this amount was not sufficient. She would accept a rebate of no less than 1 billion Pounds. This sum was not something that France was willing to accept. The result was a ten-hour argument in which Thatcher refused to compromise. "What she sought was "our own money back", a clear demonstration of her anti-European feelings and a strong sense of Britain as a country apart from the continent" (Otte 2002:16). In subsequent events we will see that her relationship with the EEC was not of an equal but rather of a superior country which did not need what the Union suggested.

During Thatcher's terms in office, European relations with Britain were characterized by the unresolved continuation about Britain's budgetary contributions. Her diplomatic style was defined as a stubborn approach. It became a symbol of her manner to negotiate. Her attitude towards Europe and her unwillingness to compromise increased her popularity in Britain. She did not see any advantage of a possible union with Europe and many British people shared this view.

One of her most famous stances against the European Community came in the fall of 1988. Jacques Delors, the French president of the Commission, suggested that national parliaments should begin to yield power to a central European Government by 1992. Within a decade, a European Government would carry out 80 per cent of the EU's decisions. Thatcher considered the idea as "airy-fairy", something that would never come in her lifetime because she was too proud of being British.

In September of 1988, she gave a speech in Bruges. The speech was essentially an attack on the attempts of the member states to create a European "United States". She criticized their desire to strengthen the central Community institutions. There would be a standardization of social welfare measures and a role for trade unions in influencing policy matters concerning the economy. In her speech she considered the centralization of the European

power as a wrong decision. Thatcher despised Socialism, which permeated the whole of the EU's social policy. She also considered the European project as a kind of USSR. "Thatcher proclamaba que Europa podría funcionar bajo un marco en el que quedarán aseguradas las tradiciones, los parlamentos y el sentimiento de orgullo nacional de cada país. Este discurso causó malestar en muchos líderes europeos e incluso, en varios ministros de la primera dama" (Cox 2010: 14).

The rapid growth of Europe and her position against it left her in isolation. She was pressured to accept the joining of the Pound in the Exchange Rate Mechanism, although she did not specify the date when this was to take place. The ERM was a stepping-stone to economic and monetary union in the EEC.

Margaret Thatcher never acknowledged that European unity might have some benefit for Britain. Perhaps the opening of the Channel Tunnel (1994) meant the only removal of the barrier between Britain and the continent. She was willing to depend solely on the superpower across the Atlantic Ocean to the detriment of cultivating a closer relation with the continent.

## **2.2.6 The Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin Wall.**

### The Beginning

One of the most important features of the end of the Cold War was the North American renewed hegemony. But how could we define the concept of Cold War?

It was the result of WWII, leaving the international front divided into two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR. Both countries were the representatives of two rival social systems: Capitalism and Socialism. This rivalry began when after the end of WWII, USSR refused to withdraw from those countries which were released from Nazism. Even the Soviet power spread to Asia. Many people considered this new bipolar order as the new stable order and each of these two superpowers balanced the imperial aspirations of the other.

In this way, although we talk about a specific war, it cannot be considered as such, since the U.S. and USSR did not engage into armed hostilities directly. Although the fear of a nuclear war existed, the reality was not to destroy each other but to maintain the peace in order to restrain the aspirations of each rival.

Many feared the outcome of the collapse of the established system in 1989. But the way the events took place so peacefully was not expected by anyone. One of the key figures who played an essential role to guarantee the peaceful transition from a stable order to another one was Mikhail Gorbachev. Others such as Reagan, Thatcher, Bush, Mitterrand and Kohl played important roles in this period, but it was Gorbachev who contributed to a great extent to change the world.

The end of the Cold War meant the union of the continent after a lot of years of division. Germany's reunification was carried out in a peaceful way. One of the consequences of the end of Communism in Europe was the Balkans war and the subsequent division of Yugoslavia in different states.

#### The End of the Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin Wall.

As we said before, one of the most important figures who played an essential role in this period was Mikhail Gorbachev. He set a series of measures to revive Soviet economy after remaining stagnant for many years under the rule of Brezhnev. He proposed a programme of reforms, inside the country and increased industrial and agricultural productivity. Gorbachev created good relations with Western leaders such as West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

His first visit to Britain was in 1984, accepting an invitation by this country. Gorbachev made a powerful impression on all the British ministers who met him. During their encounter, they defined him as sharp, wide-ranging and a good listener. His visit left an excellent impression on Thatcher. They talked about arms control and human rights. She said: "I like Mr. Gorbachev; we can do business together" (Young 1989: 393). Both leaders had in common interests such as cooperation on trade and cultural matters.

Thatcher also played a key role in the relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev, two different characters and with no much empathy. She was the bridge between them. One of the main points Gorbachev refused with so much energy was Reagan's "Star Wars". The Soviet leader was opposed to Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative but Reagan's administration was willing to continue with the project.

The first meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev took place in November 1985. They discussed about arms and the chance of ending the Cold War. With a series of meetings between these two leaders warmer relationships were possible.

In a visit to Camp David, Thatcher gave a clear lecture that the SDI was a mistake and something unattainable, something unimaginable which showed the capacity of self-belief she acquired during these years of “special relationship”. But she went on to support Reagan’s project and maintaining contacts with the Soviet leader. “Thatcher had chosen to work closely with the U.S. in the closing years of the Cold War and supported Gorbachev just enough to see the Soviet Union dissolve” (Cronin 2008: 22).

The summit in Reykjavik in 1986 was one of the best moments to set an agreement for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But Reagan was not willing to ban the SDI at any price. The summit ended in stalemate. “The American public, in particular, were prone to believe that their president had blown the best chance ever created to abolish the nuclear threat”(Young 1989: 480). Even Thatcher considered that the dependence on nuclear weapons was essential for preventing war in Europe.

In June 1987, during a speech at the Brandenburg Gate, Reagan gave a challenge to Gorbachev, if he was searching for peace and prosperity, the Berlin Wall had to fall.

It is well-known the cold relationship between Margaret Thatcher and certain European leaders. One of these examples could be the fact that she warned Spanish president Felipe González that if he did not open the Gibraltar border crossing, Spain would not enter the EEC.

We all know the importance and the key role Thatcher had during the end of the Cold War and the German reunification but she also showed some reluctance about the German question. This position was based on the fact that Thatcher and the French president Mitterrand feared that the reunification hindered the reform processes of Gorbachev. Furthermore, this fear hid suspicion towards the Germans. This position provoked frictions with the Foreign Office, which feared that with this behaviour, Britain could lose its influence on Germany and Europe.



A series of published documents written by historians from the Foreign Office show that the British premier was against the German reunification. She even considered something intolerable a common currency with a united Germany. French president François Mitterrand shared Thatcher's fears but he acted in a moderate way.

Thatcher performed before the German question as so many times what the British had done regarding the European Union, trying to prevent it, first, trying to postpone the union and finally hopping on the bandwagon in order to try to mold the reunification according to their interests.

First, Thatcher defended the Germans' self-determination, later she allowed for the German reunification to take place but after a long temporary phase. But when the reunification was inevitable, the United Kingdom contributed, in an exemplary way, with the negotiations which gave political and legal international support to the unification.

It is known the bad relationship between Thatcher and the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. This bad relationship alerted the president of the U.S. George H. W. Bush who, through a close member of the National Security Council, tried to improve the situation.

El tono peyorativo con el que Thatcher se refería a los alemanes y la manera en la que Kohl se refería a la primera dama, "esa mujer", preocupaba al presidente de los Estados Unidos, que no sabía de qué forma decirle a Thatcher que no se excluyeran de las negociaciones en un tema tan importante como la reunificación alemana (Garton Ash 2009).

Bush supported the reunification and he also considered that the British should not be excluded from this important moment.

It is necessary to say that not only Thatcher but Mitterrand saw the reunification with certain mistrust. Both European leaders feared that Gorbachev did not carry out his political and economic reforms. Thatcher's hostility towards a powerful Germany could be seen in her idea of "slowing down the reunification" although Mitterrand supported that "it would be stupid to say no to the reunification, since there is no power in Europe which can prevent it" (Young 1989: 347). Even so, Britain's position was the most negative of the Western allies. Although the French maintained their doubts, they had a

stronger and positive image towards the reunification. Even the U.S. supported the German aspirations. But the Foreign Office frustration was well-known, obeying Thatcher's orders in this respect.

Thatcher's refusal to the German reunification reached such a point that she commented Gorbachev that even the president of the U.S. George H.W. Bush shared her same opinion. "Thatcher's relations with Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush, were less close, especially when the retreat of Soviet power from central Europe raised the possibility of German reunification" (Hopkins and Young 2005: 510). This terrible fact has been pointed as a disloyalty to a historical, loyal and important NATO ally. We have to bear in mind that all this concern was being stated to the man who had the power to stop the desired German unification.

Thatcher's position was well-known by the Germans but it was something which they did not worry about. They knew that with the American pressure, the British would end up accepting it.

### **3. TONY BLAIR'S POLITICAL ALLIANCES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.**

New Right's ideas controlled the U.S. and Britain governments during the 1980s. But in 1997 New Labour swept Thatcherism with Tony Blair trying to combine social democracy with liberalism in a Third Way which looked for social achievements and economic objectives. According to this current of thought, the state has to intervene to prevent social exclusion but, at the same time, it has to provide the business world with all the possible chances in order to be competitive. The Third Way is a social, economic and political trend written by the sociologist Anthony Giddens. The Third Way refers to various political positions which try to reconcile right-wing and left-wing politics by advocating a varying synthesis of right-wing economic and left-wing social policies.

But the architect of the British version of the Third Way was Tony Blair. Although he did not have previous knowledge on foreign policy, he was fascinated by it and the multiple possibilities it could offer. He learnt a lot, even before he became Prime Minister, with the aid of the New Democrats and Clinton. They shared a close approach of the Third Way and Clinton was his most faithful adviser in many important aspects.

New Labour was Blair's main achievement, it did not have to be considered as an ideological programme but "rather as a particular method or strategy for achieving policy goals" (Buller 2004: 197). New Labour denied to choose to side with Europe or the U.S. But as we will see later, his option was to continue with the "special relationship".

### **3.1 Europe**

Before starting with Blair's European policy, we should start looking back at the Conservative legacy, above all, Thatcher's legacy. "During the years of Conservative government after 1979, Britain came to be seen as Europe's most awkward partner" (Bache and Nugent 2007: 530). Britain has always been a strong Eurosceptic country, being opposed to every change in their politics and denying certain approach towards Europe, except outstanding cases. Not only for most Conservative or Labour governments but for many British people, a closer relationship with Europe would be a loss of national sovereignty.

Thatcher's aggressive policy towards Europe was more related to the U.K. budgetary rebate. John Major opted out of the single currency and the rejection of the Social Chapter at Maastricht. He also blocked the membership of former Soviet bloc states. But a Labour government with more flexible ideas towards Europe was expected by everyone.

When Labour assumed office in 1997 was received with great expectations in order to improve Britain's relations with Europe. These expectations were greatly held by the Continent and by the country. "The British Prime Minister arrived strong and with a modernizing agenda that seemed to put Europe at the heart of Britain as much as the other way round" (Berlaymont 2007). Blair's achievements with Europe can be classified according to two points of view: first, a small group of pro-Europeans who claimed that Blair's European policy was weak, above all, with the single currency, and second, a considerable part of Eurosceptics who considered Blair had a feeling too pro-European.

Blair sought a more positive European approach, a change in their relationships. These changes involved to take advantage of what Europe offered. Blair possessed a different viewpoint in what concerned to the

European Union. He believed in better economic and social policies, and as we said before, a stronger relationships with both the U.S and the Continent.

The 1997 election manifesto identified six specific goals: the rapid completion of the single market; a high priority to be given to EU enlargement; urgent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy; the pursuit of greater openness and democracy in EU institutions; the retention of the national veto over key matters of national interest and the signing of the Social Chapter (Bache and Nugent 2007: 532).

Blair's intentions were mainly to seek a leading role in Europe. He wanted to maintain a past glory and the participation in Europe's policy could provide it. He also tried to be a bridge between U.S. and Europe.

Although Blair's style has been characterized as presidential rather than as Prime Ministerial, it is true that in certain aspects in Europe's policy, that presidential style was limited. An example of this is the single currency. Chancellor of Exchequer Gordon Brown announced in 1997 that the membership of the European single currency would depend on five economic tests. But there was no limited time to carry out these tests so finally the position was considered as opt-out. This moment stopped Blair's possibilities to reach a leadership role in Europe. During the election campaign Labour had promised a referendum on the entry to the single currency but as we have seen European policy did not depend only on Blair. Later, Britain's absence from the Eurozone continued damaging Blair's role in Europe, but above all, what damaged to a large extent Britain's role was the war in Iraq. Britain's position in Iraq distanced them from several important E.U. leaders, such as the French president and German Chancellor.

It is fair to say that one of the most important achievements in Blair's policies was that Britain was considered a "normal" E.U. member. It is true that Euroscepticism was not removed, something unthinkable, but at least countries such as Czech Republic, Poland and Sweden were more sceptical than the U.K. A more flexible policy changed U.K.'s position such as in social policy and internal security policy. Blair's government was more open and willing to do deals but without leaving national interests apart from European policy.

We have to mention three important achievements in Blair's European policy. The first one deals with E.U. enlargement. "British politicians have

always been in favour of enlargement, some with the (mistaken) hope that of a larger and looser union, some to relativise Franco-German dominance, some because it was the only thing they could find to be positive about in Europe”(Berlaymont 2007). British support was based mainly on trade reasons, and U.K. as a major trading country had to defend its position. This European policy was focused on market integration and a more heterogeneous E.U. During Blair’s premiership Europe lived two enlargement processes between 2004 and 2007 with ten former Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) with Cyprus and Malta. The opening of an accession for negotiations took place in 2005 with Croatia and Turkey. But governments such as Austria, France and Cyprus were opposed to negotiations with Turkey.

But enlargement carried a particular problem. This was to grant free access to the U.K. to CEEC workers once completed their countries’ entry in the E.U. Most member states decided on transitional restrictions. In the case of Blair, he was conditioned by pressures from his cabinet to adopt exclusionist measures, although he considered that open, not closed, was the right way. Finally he conceded temporary restrictions.

The second important achievement was to play a leading role to open and liberalize the Single European Market (SEM). It was supposed that by 1992 all barriers had disappeared but by the late 1990s these barriers existed along with other problems. Blair was an active participant to promote the need to remove market barriers along with other E.U. leaders. Even in the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, he contributed with the commitment to adopt measures to make the E.U. economy the most competitive economy in the world by 2010.

The third achievement was based on the E.U.’s treaties. Since 1980s a pattern of treaty reforms rounds were held every five years. During Blair’s premiership there were three rounds: the Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997, the Treaty of Nice in 1999-2000 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 which draft the Reform Treaty in 2007.

As we have seen, Blair achieved important European policy goals, but he also had important failures regarding his relation with the Continent. Blair wanted to put Britain in a central role in Europe’s main political decisions. “More particularly, ministers aimed to penetrate the Franco-German axis, thus enabling Britain to become an equal partner in a powerful new triumvirate”

(Buller 2004: 198). The British premier knew he could not break this strong relationship, above all, because British non-participation had distanced from the rest of Europe. Blair tried to establish close connections with the French and German leaders. The Saint-Malo Agreement in 1998 was essential to establish a good relation with Jacques Chirac. But the possibility of a warmer relation cooled soon after the negotiations of the Common Agricultural Policy. The case of Schroeder was different. Blair and the German Chancellor shared Third Way ideas but this was not enough to establish a close relationship.

In certain moments the British leader considered that the member states could be allies in different issues. He was closer to the centre-right than to the centre-left, as it was expected. He established close relationships with the Spanish president Jose Maria Aznar and the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

Another important issue to take into account was Blair's relation with the U.S. He hoped to take advantage of his privileged relation with America, obtaining a leading position in the foreign and security policies. But the French and the German leaders saw this relation cautiously. The attitude of the President of the U.S. made them suspicious: Bush did not take into account the opinions of the European leaders and he was willing to follow an isolationist policy. "Even, a united European position on Iraq might have had a chance of persuading the U.S. either not to invade until the case on weapons of mass destruction had been proved or to have handled the campaign less incompetently" (Berlaymont 2007). Blair's hopes soon decayed. He thought he could influence U.S. unilateral policy but Bush was not willing to restrain his aggressive isolationist policy. Blair's role of messenger between Europe and the United States finished with the Iraq's invasion in 2003.

But perhaps, Britain's major failure is related to the Euro. When Labour became the party in power, they adopted a cautious policy regarding the single currency. In the 1997 Manifesto, Labour promised a referendum, even Blair supported the entrance in the European currency but the absence of any public consultation promoted certain disillusionment among the pro-Europeans. Certain factors explain the absence of the referendum. The first one is that Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, agreed with adopting the currency but, persuaded by Treasury doubts and the scepticism of his economic adviser,

Ed Balls, he moved to oppose British membership. A Treasury enquiry into the implications of euro membership for Britain was launched but before knowing the results of this enquiry, the “antis” gained positions with their negative to the single currency.

The second factor was that the British economy functioned better than the rest of the member states through the Blair period. Growth in Britain was higher than the rest of Europe and the levels of unemployment were lower than in France and Germany, and these were essential reasons for the British negative.

The third factor was the implications for future electoral success if the referendum was held. Most observers considered it a total failure regardless of the outcome. The government feared the defeat and they did not risk their position. “But the longer Britain remained outside the euro zone, the more marginalized it would become in the debates concerning the E.U’s future development” (Buller 2004: 202).

Many authors called the Blair European policy period as a period of “Europeanization”. What does it mean? Britain and the Continent established close relations in certain policies. Although these policies did not start in 1997, it was Blair who continued and set them up. In the case of environmental policy, an advancement was seen towards a shift in source-based emission controls and the acceptance of EU guiding principles in precaution, prevention and sustainability. A step forward was given when Britain exported its own ideas at E.U. level, something unthinkable 15 years ago. “In terms of strategy, the main thought behind the government’s approach was the idea of influence in Europe” (Browne 2006).

In the case of competition policy, the Labour government’s 1988 Competition Act was closer to the line of the EU. In regional policy Britain accepted EU guiding principles, above all, in what concerned domestic regeneration and neighbourhood programmes.

Under the Blair government, Britain brought closer continental systems of governance, that is, a multi-level governance system which was common in the European Union. These changes were in devolution, the independence for the Bank of England, the adoption of proportional representation for elections to devolved authorities and the European Parliament, the incorporation of the

European Convention on Human Rights, the introduction of a Freedom of Information Act, a reform of the House of Lords and a modernization of the House of Commons.

How could we define Blair's policy in Europe? It can be considered more liberal in tone and focus. Britain's position had improved. Britain changed from being a suspicious character to a closer member. Blair achieved strong policies although he did not succeed in his attempt to put Britain in a higher level. Britain could have performed as an important actor not as a mere observer. It was perhaps in the economy where Blair's influence is more remarkable. But in the fight against years of Euroscepticism it was almost impossible to succeed. He fought against a powerful media and against a considerable group of anti-European citizens. It is possible that Blair's behaviour regarding Europe could be defined as modest, but it is true that he claimed his Europeism and his commitment to improve their relationship publicly.

But his great failure was his weakness to send a pro-European message to his country in a stronger and more solid way. He avoided risks with the British, because these risks implied a unique result for his party, the electoral defeat. "So, a stronger British role in Europe will depend not only on the government changing the way it deals with the E.U., for example through forging alliances with other members. It will also depend on the British people learning to view the E.U. in a different way" (Grant 1998: 78).

### **3.2 The United States.**

#### **3.2.1 Bill Clinton (1993-2001).**

As we have seen before, although the Thatcher-Reagan relationship was one of the closest alliances in that "special relationship", the Blair-Clinton axis was also important. As Thatcher and Reagan, Clinton and Blair had their frictions, in their case, the Kosovo conflict cooled their relation, but they still keep their friendship.

How did Bill Clinton influence on Blair? Clinton left as big an impression on Blair as no other foreign leader did. They also maintained a close relation and both leaders shared Third Way ideas and were considered, unlike Thatcher, non-ideologists within their parties. "The Clinton presidency was marked by liberal internationalist ideas but vacillation in the way they were



implemented. It was characterized by some as 'the crisis of liberal internationalism'" (Clarke 2007: 594).

Their first meeting was in 1995 in the U.S. Ambassador's residence in London. Blair was still the Labour candidate for the next elections. Both leaders shared important ideas such as the progressive left, ideas shared with Wim Kok of Holland and Cardoso of Brazil, leaders who followed the same thinking. In this first meeting Blair showed a great interest about the way Clinton had moved the Democrats into the centre ground. "Blair shared with Clinton a sense of finding that political middle and a passion for politicking" (Hodgson 2007).

Blair and his team considered this first meeting as very interesting and decided another meeting before the General Elections. This second meeting took place on 11 April 1996. The dinner was in Edwin Lutyens' grand ambassador's residence. In this occasion, the American guests were impressed by Blair's charm and confidence. "Blair got the heart of America (it's all about aspiration) and more than anything else, this might explain some of the British animosity toward him" (Morgan 2010). The next day Blair and his team visited Clinton at the White House. The meeting lasted an hour, something uncommon taking into account that Blair was not the leader of a country but only the head figure of the opposition. They talked about taxes, Northern Ireland and the developing world.

The next meeting did not take place until Blair's election as Prime Minister. The Clintons had a stop in London during a European tour. Both couples had a great connection and a close personal friendship. The four of them were lawyers and had the same ideas in education and welfare. But what joined both leaders to a great extent was the Third Way ideology. Hillary persuaded her husband to organize a meeting at the White House coinciding with Blair's state visit in 1998. In that period a sexual scandal exploded in Washington. This time was an intern, Monica Lewinsky, maintained that she had a sexual relationship with the U.S. president. At first, a cancellation of the trip was considered appropriate but Blair wanted to go ahead with it and Clinton considered Blair's support of vital importance for his damaged image around the world. "Blair was determined to stand by Clinton both for political reasons and for personal reasons" (Seldon 2004: 373). During the state dinner, Blair, answering a toast made by Clinton, quoted some biblical remarks made by

Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt special envoy to the United Kingdom, used to transmit to Churchill the solidarity of the American people: "Whither you goest I will go, and whither thou lodgest I will lodge. Thy people shall be my people, and thy God, my God". Perhaps too sentimental but it was what Clinton's team wanted to hear. During this visit the foreign agenda mainly dealt with Iraq and the possibility of using the force if Saddam did not collaborate with the UN. Blair also transmitted Clinton his concern about Northern Ireland situation.

Both leaders had no other encounter until April 1999. Kosovo was the main item in their agenda. This was perhaps the affair which cooled their relationship. After a telephone conversation in May of that same year and under severe pressures they had a clash in what they considered it was the right way to perform. This crisis determined their future relation, which although it was close, it was not as warm as in previous years. Doubts about Clinton's performance in the Kosovo war and Clinton's sexual affairs meant a turning point in their relations.

A short time before U.S. presidential elections, Blair considered the new Democrat candidate, Al Gore. But he did not feel the same closeness as with Clinton. Blair and Gore did not share the same ideas related to the Third Way and did not have the same affinity. Before his term was finished, Clinton advised the British premier "get as close to George Bush as you have been to me" and "don't underestimate George W. He's a shrewd, tough politician and absolutely ruthless" (Seldon 2004: 378).

Despite their close relationship, we cannot compare it with that of Thatcher and Reagan. Clinton and Blair did not share the same foreign policy or, at least, not the same ideas in certain events. That is the case of the Kosovo conflict, no Anglo-American peace initiatives in the Middle East, no globalization or environment initiatives. "But Clinton took into account a clear Kennedy maxim that British influence in Washington would largely depend on its influence across Europe and Tony Blair instinctively agreed". (Clarke 2007: 602).

It is important to point out that not only Blair but Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was influenced by the U.S. This was the case of the independence of the Bank of England, the Working Family's Tax Credit, "back to work policy", a similar concept to the U.S. workfare, and the childcare assistance, to support single mothers to return to employment.

Blair did not keep a closer relationship with other leaders as he did with Clinton. Clinton's "New Democrats" were of great aid and support not only for the British prime minister but for his team. With this relationship, it started Blair's ideas of acting as a bridge between both continents, an idea developed with Bush as well and with unexpected results.

In his first term, Blair was involved in three armed conflicts: the first Iraq conflict (1998), Kosovo (1999) one of the most important decisions of his life and Sierra Leone (2000). Kosovo was the conflict which cooled his relationship with Clinton due to their different thoughts in the way to manage the crisis. Let's start with the first Iraq conflict also known as "Desert Fox".

### ***Operation Desert Fox (1998)***

This was the first conflict Blair had to face. After the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Saddam had to fulfill certain obligations, for instance to allow UN inspectors to inspect certain places where they could think the Iraqi leader kept weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On one hand, Saddam argued they were not objective in their search. On the other hand, the UN inspectors complained Saddam did not allow them to inspect some places such as his palaces. Britain's position was that Saddam had to obey the law.

The idea that Saddam could keep WMD was taken very seriously by Blair. He even considered that the U.S. president had to announce Saddam's threat to the world. But at the beginning of 1998, Clinton lost his patience and decided to take action. The plan would consist of a barrage of air strikes. Clinton's administration would act in accordance with Britain and France, but with this last country America had certain doubts. But Blair showed him his unconditional support in this attack. But before the attack started, on 23 February 1998, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN had an interview with the Iraqi leader getting some inspections in the presidential palaces.

Although the Americans remained sceptical, inspections resumed. But in October, Saddam expelled the inspectors. In November a document "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction" was presented to the MPS, highlighting the use of these type of weapons. As America suspected, France did not support the attack, so Britain and the U.S. would continue alone. Two types of missiles were prepared for the action. But again Kofi Annan informed that Saddam

Hussein was ready to resume cooperation. The planes returned to base. Blair considered that the attack should be launched although Saddam wanted to resume the inspections. This was another method to buy time.

Clinton threatened that if the Iraqi leader did not fulfill with the UN demands, Iraq would be attacked from the air. On 11 December 1998 Clinton and Blair agreed that Saddam was not fulfilling the UN demands. In response to Saddam's intransigent behaviour, President Bill Clinton declared on December 16 that Hussein had "abused his last chance" and that he had directed US forces to strike military and regime security targets in Iraq (Conversino 2005). Clinton agreed that the attack would be launched on 16 December but they faced Russia, France and China, permanent members of the UN which were hostile to the attack. Blair and Clinton would act alone.

Blair met the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy committee on the afternoon of 15 December to secure British agreement for the attacks. On 16 December, Clinton gave the order to commence what would be known as "Operation Desert Fox". Blair's concern was the possible loss of British servicemen and his isolationist position from the rest of the E.U. leaders.

The British leader explained the Parliament and the public opinion that this attack was against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein not against the Iraqi people. On 20 December Clinton and Blair finished the attack. The White House considered that this attack had caused Saddam a year or two's delay in his weapons programme.

What did Blair achieve with this attack? The support to the U.S, to manage public reaction in a successful way and, what is more important, an increase in his self-confidence. For many authors, this was the first step to the second Iraq war.

### **Kosovo (1999)**

One of the main conflicts Europe had to face after the end of the Cold War and as a consequence of it was the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia. Before his arrival in power, Blair considered why Britain did not have a key role to stop the humanitarian tragedy that the former Yugoslavia was experiencing and more precisely in the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995. Britain's government changed to a more active policy. In the International Contact

Group, formed by Britain, the U.S., Russia, Germany, France and Italy, Britain played a leading role. This Contact Group warned of an imminent human catastrophe and insisted that the Kosovo refugees should return to their homes. After establishing negotiations between a U.S. envoy and Milosevic, a cease fire was agreed. "As fighting resumed in February 1999, the six-nation Contact Group (U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) summoned both sides, Serbs and Kosovars, to talks in Rambouillet, France, and proposed they sign an Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo" (Berlaymont 2007). They required Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo, accept its autonomy and allow a NATO peacekeeping force in return for the disarmament of the KLA.

In March 1999 the situation of the refugee deteriorated considerably. Public opinion pressured after seeing television pictures which showed 25,000 Kosovars being forced from their homes. With this prospect NATO military response was on its way. But two of the nineteen NATO countries, Greece and Italy, were opposed to a military action.

Milosevic showed indifference to a possible NATO air attack. He did not believe in the unity of the NATO forces and he strongly believed that Boris Yeltsin, the Russian leader, would support him. The air attack started on 24 March. Although the plan was an intense aerial bombardment of seventy-two hours against Milosevic's key military places, the result was negative. The bombing had the opposite effect, killing innocent civilians. The bombing was used by Milosevic to accelerate the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

This failure was one of the saddest moments in Blair's premiership. He considered that this bombing attack had resulted in the opposite effect he was fighting for. From this moment on, he decided to take personal charge. With the aid of a trusted military chief, Charles Guthrie, he reconsidered what was wrong. In this discussions Blair stated that the only way to threaten Milosevic in a credible way was using ground troops. Guthrie pointed out the difficulties. America was against the use of ground troops. In spite of everything Blair stated that there was no other alternative and on 16 April, he sent a letter to Clinton, setting out the arguments.

The British premier began to plan the ground attack. He considered that the possibility of an agreement among all the NATO members was too slow.

Blair talked to General Wesley Clark, the NATO Supreme Commander and explained his intentions of a ground attack against Milosevic. Clark saw in Blair an excellent ally to persuade Clinton to change his position.

On 22 April, Blair stated on a major speech in the Chicago Economic Club the thoughts he had been articulated the previous year to justify a military action. The speech was written by Lawrence Friedman, the doyen professor of defence studies. His task consisted of provide clear lines to legitimate the intervention in internal affairs of a sovereign state as was the case of Iraq.

In the speech, Blair outlined a Doctrine of the International Community. He stated that a war is not only based on any territorial ambitions but on halting or preventing humanitarian disasters such as genocide or ethnic cleansing. In helping to decide when and where to intervene, he proposed that five major questions should be asked – as illustrating the kind of issues that should be taken into account in decision-making, rather than as absolute tests:

1. Are we sure of our case?
2. Have we exhausted all diplomatic options?
3. Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake?
4. Are we prepared for the long term?
5. Do we have national interests involved?

Where the answer to all five questions is “yes” then there is a strong case for intervention.

The speech did not establish a separate line between where it left international law and the position of the United Nations.

The night before the Chicago speech Clinton and Blair had their tensest meeting. Blair insisted that only the deployment of ground troops would convince Milosevic of a withdrawal. The Clinton administration was cautious about intervening in Yugoslavia. “The United States insisted that the fate of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia was a European problem that Europeans should address” (Cronin 2008: 25). It was reluctant to commit its own forces or to support UN efforts. But after a meeting between both leaders, a deal was made. They would divide up the NATO leaders to convince them in favour of the formulation. Instead, Blair did not set out the idea at the NATO summit and Clinton would do whatever was necessary to ensure victory. All NATO members

agreed that the Serbs had to be removed from Kosovo but what they did not know was how they would achieve this.

The passivity of Clinton's administration was criticized and it appeared in the press. Clinton blamed Blair's people of giving information to media. By that time enormous losses had been incurred. "Policymakers in the U.S., Britain and elsewhere had concluded that the failure to act earlier had demonstrated once again the ineffectiveness of existing international institutions, especially the European Union and the United Nations" (Cronin 2008: 30).

Civilian deaths continued for the next two weeks. Britain was willing to send 50,000 troops to Kosovo. But it would be the two superpowers, the U.S. and Russia who put to an end the Kosovo war. On 14 April Russian president Boris Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin as the special envoy to the Balkans. On 3 May Chernomyrdin met Clinton in Washington. America's aim was to persuade the Russians to end the support to the Serbs and make sure that Russia would not intervene if NATO launched a ground invasion. Blair was up to date of these talks.

On 9 June, the Serbs decided to withdraw from Kosovo. NATO's unity was essential to face Milosevic but it would be the diplomacy between the U.S. and Russia which put to an end the conflict. But it is true that Blair's pressure towards a harder line against Milosevic was the initial point to end one of the most humanitarian disasters in Europe.

Success in Kosovo was critical in three respects: first, it underlined the reality and potential usefulness of the "special relationship" in international affairs; second, it provided a practical template for military intervention outside the control of the UN and third, because intervention in Kosovo was judge to have been "illegal, but legitimate", it, in effect, stretched the acceptable boundaries of international law so as to permit clear violations of sovereignty by *ad hoc* "coalitions of the willing".

### **Sierra Leone (2000)**

The crisis lived in the former British colony of Sierra Leone in 2000 provided Blair a new opportunity to demonstrate his idea of the use of the force to face complex humanitarian situations. On August 2000 the British government had sent a contingent of 700 soldiers to release half a thousand

soldiers who belonged to a multinational force of the UN. This multinational force was in the country to avoid a civil war between the two rival factions and to evacuate the foreign population. Once completed the task, the rebel forces took eleven British soldiers as hostages. Blair sent a second contingent which saved them in a brilliant rescue operation. "The pragmatic result was better than all the likely alternatives had the intervention not occurred" (Clarke 2007: 604).

The Sierra Leone crisis fostered Blair to involve himself in the terrible situation of Africa, which was expressed in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Its main idea was the debt relief and the development of the implementation of political and economic reforms.

In short, the main objective of eliminating dictatorships and establishing democracies through regime changes in what we later knew as "rogue states" was part of the Blair Doctrine at the beginning of the new millennium and developed soon afterwards.

### **3.2.2 George W. Bush (2001-2009)**

What made the close relationship between Blair and Bush so singular is, perhaps, the difference between them, a difference in character and the way to perform in politics. Bush is a close-minded politician, with deep conservative ideas and surrounded by hard-right advisers. The case of Blair is different, an open-minded politician, with mild left-wing ideas, close to the centre, and widely internationalist. In spite of such differences, "personality traits, religious conviction, personal understanding of the logic global power, the obligations of the "special relationship", British interests: all these forces conspired to push Blair in the direction of the Bush administration" (Dumbrell 2009: 310).

By the turn of the millennium, therefore, Anglo-American power and a particular vision of how it should be deployed was a structural feature of the emerging world order. This Anglo-American power was embodied in three main principles: "first, the maintenance of U.S. military strength and predominance; second, a shared commitment to open and opening markets and third, the corollary that "humanitarian intervention" might be necessary to deter or replace "rogue states" when engagement had otherwise failed". (Clarke 2007: 600).

The 2000 presidential election was of great importance for Blair and his team. They supported Al Gore's victory, mainly due to political affinity. But the



possibility of a Republican victory was there. Even then, Blair's team feared that the close Clinton-Blair close relationship could harm a future relationship with Bush but some members of Bush's team calmed them down. Loyalty was one of the qualities Bush most admired.

The reports Blair had from Washington were pessimistic since the Bush administration wanted to dissociate itself from Clinton's policy, mainly from his internationalism. But Blair decided to establish a close relationship with the next administration. "The tension between the global vision of the United States, and its closest ally, and the hopes of others, including some traditional U.S. or U.K. allies, for a more multipolar and multilateral world order, were thus embedded in the emerging international system at the end of the century". (Cronin 2008: 29). Their unilateralist view was well-known, but also that they considered of extreme importance the bilateral relationship with Britain. Yet from the beginning, Schroder and other European leaders did not have great enthusiasm in a close relationship with the new American administration.

The first Bush-Blair summit was on 23 February 2001. Blair's team decided a first contact before the summit. Blair sent Jonathan Powell and John Sawers for a first contact with some of Bush's close advisers such as Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and Karl Rove. They talked about Iraq, the Balkans, U.S. plans for a national missile defence system and Europe defence. The British advisers saw their unilateralist side, above all in what concerned to the destabilization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But Britain maintained a fixed idea: America was most dangerous and irresponsible when denied the civilizing wisdom of its British ally. They also repeatedly emphasized that, if Britain were to veer away from America, it would be exceedingly difficult later to recover lost ground.

The first Bush-Blair contact would define Britain's role as America's closest ally, and its role as a bridge in Europe. All of them knew that America would operate without Britain perfectly well. Blair's team feared Cheney's unilateralist viewpoint but it was essential that both leaders had personal chemistry and became each other's best friend. Bush received his guests with a warm greeting. During lunch, they talked about strengthening sanctions against Saddam. No invasion was mentioned. Bush also flattered Blair over his wide knowledge about international affairs. Bush was very interested in the

Russians and he wanted to learn more about Putin. Blair talked about Putin and about a future progress in the Middle East. During the talks, some deals were treated. America supported the European Defence Initiative launched by Blair and Chirac, insisting that it would not represent a conflict with NATO. Blair, in this moment began his concessions: Britain would support their plan for national missile defence, but after consulting other countries. Blair even agreed that the U.S. should upgrade warning stations in British soil, although that would trigger the opposition of the left wing. So, the expected summit ended with a more than positive outcome.

Bush had two main concerns, at least, until 9/11. The first one was the development of the national missile defence and the second one, a possible and necessary relationship with Russia, something in which Blair could help to a great extent. Bush's missile defence plan incensed Putin who considered this plan as an abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The first meeting between Putin and Bush took place in Ljubljana, capital of Slovenia in 2001. The U.S. president considered the Russian leader a future "partner and ally".

Blair's role as bridge was essential in certain moments. That was the case of the E.U.-U.S. summit at Gothenburg in June 2001. Bush confirmed what many in his team suspected, the distant relationship with Chirac and Schroeder, their hostility to U.S. rejection of the Kyoto protocol of 1997 on climate change and global warming. This summit showed that Britain was the only dependable European state for America. "Downing Street's attempts to square the US-European circle risked a double bind: being seen in Western Europe as a stalking horse for American imperialism and in Washington as being implicated in Franco-German schemes to "rebalance" against the U.S." (Hodgson 2007).

During the summer of 2001 Blair and Bush were keeping in touch, planning an autumn with a series of issues, preparing diplomatic meetings. Terrorism was not in their talks, but what they did not know is that shortly afterwards, this issue focused their main policies and even the rest of their terms.

The events of 9/11 deepened their relationship. Their central problem was in that moment the fight against terrorism and to fight against "rogue states", those states which supported terrorism. Osama Bin Laden and Saddam

Hussein became the evil enemy. Blair's fear was that this event took America to a more unilateralist position, even more extreme than he expected.

Blair was the politician who reacted with more intensity and emotion to the Sept-11 attacks against the U.S. "No other state has the daily involvement in the planning and preparation of operations that the U.K. had with the U.S." (Dumbrell 2009: 312). Even during the Afghan war (2001), Blair was Bush's closest leader, often discussing the war's progression, but the Middle East peace process would be their main difference. But apart from that issue, they worked closely against terrorism. An example of this partnership was the tensions between India and Pakistan, which in 2002 appeared close to nuclear confrontation. Both leaders worked closely and successfully to prevent a possible conflict.

"In the aftermath of 9/11, Blair's tactical error was to allow the Americans to believe that the British would be with them come what may" (Seldon 2004: 618). In subsequent meetings, Bush took for granted Blair's support. What did Blair receive in return? Not much. A promise to work through the UN. But as we said, it was only a promise. Blair knew that without the UN, an international coalition was almost impossible. Blair's support meant Bush's support in the Middle East process, at least at the beginning.

By April 2002, Blair believed in a possible progress in what concerned to the Middle East. Bush urged Sharon, Israel prime minister, to withdraw from Palestinian cities recently occupied. But in the Foreign Office this act remained suspicious. They did not believe that an American president could suggest such idea. And unfortunately, it was true. Hawks in Washington considered that Bush's tough words would fade. Even the Pentagon and the Vice-President's office did not show any interest in these words nor in Blair's Middle East peace process. On a statement on 24 June 2002, Bush claimed that the Palestinians had to elect new leaders, that is, a new democratic Palestinian authority, not Yasser Arafat. This was a victory for Sharon and an unfortunate blow for Blair.

In July 2002, Blair had the clear idea that Bush's attitude was damaging the U.S. reputation in Europe and the Middle East. Even in press articles the special relationship was portrayed damaging Blair's image as "Bush's poodle".

At the beginning of 2003, Blair decided to intensify his efforts to convince Bush to continue with the Middle East peace process. On 23 January, Blair sent

Michael Levy, his Middle East envoy, to see Arafat. Blair's intention was to press the Palestinian leader to appoint a new Palestinian Prime Minister, thus making attractive for the Americans the view to continue with the peace process. Arafat's behaviour was very positive. Blair continued the negotiations with Bush. The British leader stated that he needed the publication of a Middle East "road map" if he wanted to acquire the support of the Parliament at home for a possible military action in Iraq. On March 2003 Bush announced that the road map would be published when Abu Mazen, the new Palestinian Prime Minister, was installed. All these proposals were made thanks to Blair's strength and his faith to put to an end a conflict which already lasted too many years.

At a meeting at Hillsborough castle on 27 March 2003, a progress on the Middle East peace process was made. At the end of April the road map was published and Bush travelled to Jordan in June for a meeting with Abu Mazen and Sharon. Blair saw his dream came true after months waiting for the final step. But violence increased and all his hopes faded. Mazen resigned after differences with Arafat. "Blair had staked a good deal of personal capital on pushing the vision of a new start in regional relations within and between the key players" (Clarke 2007: 609). This meant the end of the road map.

During 2003 Bush was focused on his re-election campaign. Blair continued with his domestic affairs but the British leader tried to persuade Bush of the necessity of a UN resolution if a future war in Iraq was carried out.

### ***The Iraq War (2003-2010).***

During a trip from Camp David, Blair shared with some journalists his fear that Saddam could possess weapons of mass destruction. The main charge against the Iraqi leader was his complete refusal to comply with UN inspectors in order to verify if he possessed arms of that kind.

Blair's intentions since short after 9/11 were to present the public a dossier which showed the complicity of Saddam and Bin Laden and, above all, that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. This would be the first step in order to prepare the ground for a possible war if the Iraqi leader did not comply with the resolutions. Some said that Saddam had broken UN resolutions, so it was the best proof to go to war, but this idea did not convince Blair completely. He knew that the Parliament and British public were anti-war

and a dossier as a justification for this action would be necessary for his plans. Bush said that he could present a dossier but the CIA and the Pentagon prevented a possible publication.

The preparation of a dossier became a desperate activity. The chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) presented the document. Blair considered that the dossier was not focused enough on human rights but it would do the job. Blair presented the dossier "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Assessment of the British Government" on 24 of September. The dossier is divided in three main parts, beginning with a foreword of the Prime Minister in which he explains the reason of this dossier.

In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world (from "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government").

The dossier continues with an Executive Summary which expands on what Saddam possessed, chemical and biological agents and weapons, etc. The dossier continues with the first part, "Iraq's Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programmes" divided in three main chapters which develop the role of Intelligence, Iraq's programmes from 1971 to 1998 and the current position from 1998 to 2002. The second part deals with the history of UN weapons inspections and the third and last part tells the history of Iraq under Saddam Hussein's rule.

In the dossier the evidence of nuclear weapons is not clear enough but the idea of chemical and biological weapons is much firmer. Some said that the dossier set out what the government wanted to hear but it is true that many in Blair's cabinet thought that Saddam had WMD. Many people in the Intelligence community were not completely convinced of the veracity of the dossier. A well-known and tragic event happened when the BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan stated in 2003, quoting Alastair Campbell's words, that the government had "sexed up" the material provided in the famous dossier, which resulted in the

suicide of Dr David Kelly, expert on biological warfare and UN weapons inspector in Iraq, and the whole protracted saga of the Hutton Inquiry. The dossier also claimed that Baghdad had sought uranium from Africa for nuclear weapons but later it was admitted that the information was wrong. British citizens claimed that their leader knew that Saddam had no WMD and he lied to go to war. But as shown, Blair was completely convinced of what the dossier stated and he believed firmly in what it said. The possession of this type of WMD fostered the idea of humanitarian intervention as a matter of security and that democracy would be promoted not merely by engagement but by force; and the choice for force would be made largely by the United States, in league with its most trusted or at least compliant ally. "Not only had Blair and Clinton, for example, backed the use of force on more than one occasion, but Reagan, Thatcher and the first president Bush had happily used the rhetoric of human rights and democracy as a complement to arms" ( Dumbrell 2009: 308).

The first UN resolution took eight weeks of hard work. Blair continued with his stance that Iraq possessed WMD. If he could do with the UN support, it would be better not only for domestic reasons or for EU leaders and Russia but for avoid a unilateralist act of America. If Saddam made impossible the inspectors' work, the idea of war would not be so awful. But the British premier was completely convinced that Iraq had WMD.

Blair's role as bridge between America and Europe was not so credible. Neither did certain European leaders such as Schroeder and Chirac believe in that role, nor the hawks in Washington who maintained that they did not need Europe's support for a more than possible war. "The subtleties of the British approach to European defence questions were an immediate casualty of the Iraq war and relations with France and Germany deteriorated on a range of issues. Schroeder, Chirac and Putin formed a diplomatic front against Blair" (Cronin 2008: 31).

During the negotiations of the UN resolution, Blair and Bush were regularly informed. The EU leaders' scepticism in this resolution became more evident when the Congress gave Bush a green light to use armed force against Iraq if it was "necessary and appropriate". This step assured the war and the unilateralism Blair feared. This step was more evident when the Pentagon took the final decision to prepare for the war in the autumn of 2003.

On 8 November 2003 the UN Security Council passed the Resolution 1441. This resolution declared Saddam in material breach of his responsibilities under previous UN resolutions, giving him a final opportunity to comply or face serious consequences. Blair and Bush celebrated this victory but Blair, above all, assured himself a secure international backing.

Saddam allowed the inspectors back into Iraq. The Iraqi response of 7 December 2003 seemed to the US as something already seen on what the Iraqi dictator had said years before. Cheney told Bush they were prepared for war and Saddam response did not indicate the opposite. On 18 December, Bush told the Spanish president Aznar that Saddam was a liar and he had no intention of disarming. The next day, Colin Powell declared Iraq to be in material breach. Without UN endorsement Blair was in a big trouble.

Britain prepared its military troops for a deployment in the Gulf. Blair stated that this act had the intention to make the threat more credible for Saddam. Some of his advisers told him that a second UN resolution was necessary to convince the Parliament and the public opinion. But Blair knew that he needed even more than that.

The beginning of the New Year started with conversations between both leaders. Britain asked for active support for a second resolution and more time to use diplomacy to solve the crisis. The problem was that all the power fell on Cheney and Rumsfeld and Blair did not have a close link or share empathy with these two hawks.

Anti-American movements against the war began to appear. Blair was determined to achieve a second resolution. Britain was conscious that they were not a superpower. They needed the Arab support and, of course, that of the EU. So a second UN resolution was necessary. European attacks against American preparations for the war began to be deployed. That was the case of the French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin and the declaration of the German leader "War is always an admission of defeat" (Seldon 2004: 589).

A trip to Washington was essential to continue with his hopes. Before he arrived to the city, he received a message. The Washington Embassy warned him that neither a negotiation for a second resolution nor the necessity of more time would be accepted by the American administration. During the meeting, Bush, Cheney and Powell were opposed to a second resolution. Blair told the

president to do it as a personal favour. He needed it in order to not damage his domestic affairs. At the press conference Bush said that if the UN passed a second resolution, it would be welcome. Blair felt relieved with this opportunity but the President insisted that a vote on it had to be concluded by mid-March at the latest.

Blair felt confident with a possible second resolution. He had the support of Spain and Bulgaria along with Britain and the U.S. He needed the support of only five non-permanent members, assuming that other permanent members did not dare to veto it. During the first two weeks of March, he looked for consensus with great effort and hyperactivity.

The Bush administration had its own opinion in achieving a second resolution and in Blair's consensus. "Both presidents were fighting different wars. For Blair, Iraq was about upholding values and the will of the international community; for Bush it was a demonstration of raw power to achieve a national purpose" (Clarke 2007: 607).

Hans Blix, the UN inspector made a first report on 27 January which was critical with Iraq. But the inspections reported that there were no WMD. Blix discovered that Iraq's cooperation was increasing. The third report on 7 March informed that Iraqi cooperation was accelerating.

But on 10 March Chirac announced that France would veto a second resolution "whatever the circumstances". Blair felt shocked and betrayed with Chirac's attitude. He felt that the negotiation was over. Secretary of Defence Hoon told Rumsfeld that without a second resolution, Blair might not be able to commit British troops. Rumsfeld's answer was as it expected, America would go alone if it was necessary. Even "on the eve of war, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld blurted out at a press conference in Washington that British military involvement was not essential to the invasion" (Dumbrell 2009: 303).

Blair had to face with one of his biggest decisions as Prime Minister. Bush, fearing that Blair's government could fall, offered Blair to leave British troops for the last part of the conflict, as peacekeepers. But Blair rejected the offer.

Blair's best supporters were Gordon and Prescott, although they were alarmed that no other option could be presented. In the case of Cook, he



announced his intention to resign if the process was abandoned. His intention came true four days later.

On 16 March Bush joined with Blair and the Spanish president Aznar in a summit in the Azores. They discussed final military plans and Blair persuaded Bush to continue with the Middle East peace process.

The conflict started on March 20, 2003 in which a combined force of troops from the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Poland invaded Iraq. The invasion phase consisted of a fought war which concluded with the capture of the Iraq capital, Baghdad, by the U.S. forces.

During the war Blair followed the progress of his troops with maps. Every British death was a terrible shock for him. We can say that the British premier took a great risk with this war. He will be remembered not by his achievements on domestic affairs but rather for the Iraq war. And it is also true that “the Iraq war of 2003, by common consent, has been the most evident U.S. foreign policy blunder since Vietnam, and may ultimately prove to have even greater consequences for the U.S. role in the world”. (Clarke 2007: 605).

But which country lost more with this war? Britain, with its support taken for granted or America, with its deep unilateralist feeling?

#### **4. CONCLUSION: COINCIDENCES AND DIVERGENCES.**

The axes Thatcher-Reagan and Clinton-Blair are the precursors of the New Right in the 1980s, the former, and New Labour in the 1990s, the latter. Let's start with the mutual admiration that both British premiers felt for each other.

When we talk about the coincidences and divergences in politics, in our case in foreign policy, between Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, we have to bear in mind the different ideologies both leaders followed as Prime Ministers. The New Right was the ideology which carried more weight. The Third Way combines ideas from the New Right and from the Old Left, with certain restraints but with less coherence than the New Right, which is much clearer and more focused.

After the end of Blair's premiership and analyzing his performance, we can say that Blair was Thatcher's truest heir. She saw in him a loyal follower of

her policies. It might be shocking if we do not understand about politics and if we take into account that both leaders represented the two opposite political parties which shared power in Britain, the Conservative in the case of Thatcher and Labour in the case of Blair.

Blair considered Thatcher one of the iconic figures in his life. He admired her use of language, her style of leadership and her strong authority in foreign issues. Furthermore, he admired Thatcher's character, her radicalism, courage and determination. Blair always expressed admiration for the Iron Lady, something which provoked rejection within the Labour party.

Thatcher was fascinated by Blair's charm too, his capacity to attract people's attention and interest and his capacity to tell people what they wanted to hear. She considered him the most formidable Labour leader since Hugh Gaitskell. Thatcher visited Downing Street several times since the beginning of Blair's premiership, so they kept in touch. He asked her about domestic and foreign affairs. He even compared himself during the Kosovo Crisis with Thatcher during the Falklands war. Thatcher was an important figure in his political career. She felt betrayed by Blair's Labour government in certain moments as was the case of General Pinochet affair, when he was arrested in Britain due to a serial abuse of human rights. The Chilean General supported Britain in the Falklands war and Thatcher claimed that he had saved Chile from Communism. During the 2001 electoral campaign she attacked Blair, but they continued their close relationship of mutual admiration.

### **What kind of coincidences and divergences can we find in Thatcher's and Blair's performance?**

#### ***Coincidences***

Both leaders were precursors of new ideologies within their parties. Although with different results as regards ideological issues, they were outsiders in their own organizations and these variations from their parties' ideology were tolerated because they kept winning elections. Thatcher was despised by many traditional Tories and so was Blair by traditional Labour quarters.

Thatcher and Blair broke the mold when they achieved the leadership in their parties. Thatcher was the first woman who led a British political party and also the first woman who achieved the British premiership. Blair was the youngest man to lead the Labour party.

Both leaders felt that their mission was to save Great Britain. They shared the same idea of a powerful Britain, with its glorious past and its possible leadership in the world. They wanted back the ancient glorious past of Britain and both agreed that America would play an important role to achieve this aim. But this led to a complete subjugation to the U.S. in foreign affairs. Although Blair could not manage to influence on Bush's foreign policies, Thatcher had certain influence on Reagan, since both leaders maintained a closer relationship and shared many political ideas.

They also shared a complete devotion to their "special relationship" with the U.S. Thatcher got certain benefits with his close relation with Reagan. Both right-wing leaders carried out similar policies in Britain and the U.S. respectively. During the Falklands war, the American president supported Britain in many aspects and his help was of great importance to win the war against Argentina.

In Blair's case he coincided during his premiership with two American presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. With Clinton, a Democrat president, Blair shared mutual admiration and the Third Way agenda. It was not only a political relationship but a personal one. Clinton's policies were more moderate. He had multilateral ideas although the threat of isolationism was always present. Bush's case was different. Bush and Blair maintained a close relationship but Bush's foreign policy was more aggressive and strongly unilateral. Blair's contributions towards America's foreign policy were of great importance but Bush was always willing to carry out his policies alone. Blair and Thatcher feared the strong isolationist policy of the U.S. and they maintained that Britain had to support America to keep the stability of the world stage.

Both Prime Ministers tried to position Britain on the world stage as a force mediating between the U.S. and the USSR (later Russia). They were the first leaders to accept Gorbachev, in the case of Thatcher, and Putin, in the

case of Blair, in the international political community. They maintained excellent relationships with both Soviet (and Russian) leaders. Thanks to these approaches, certain European countries began to maintain closer relationships with Russia.

As time went by, both British premiers became intolerant and inflexible within their cabinet and with certain policies. Both were figures of unquestionable courage and energy, two essential personal features in order to become a leader. They showed self-reliance in difficult periods during their time in office. In the case of Thatcher after the Falklands war, her self-esteem grew until unsuspected levels. The case of Blair was similar during the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 which brought the desired peace to Northern Ireland. The solution of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 gave him the energy to solve any conflict which could appear in the international scene. As we have seen previously, the solution to these conflicts gave him enough strength to face an important war as was the Iraq conflict.

As regards their fall, it was very similar in both cases. They were too arrogant and authoritarian within their cabinets. In Thatcher's case, her resignation in 1990 as Prime Minister was due to an internal division within the Conservative party because of different points of view about European policy, the unstable British economy and the famous Poll Tax.

Blair's resignation in 2007 was due to a Labour rebellion against his foreign policy of the previous seven years. The Afghanistan war in 2001, first, and the Iraq war in 2003 triggered his fall in politics and in public opinion. The same public opinion which had led him to win three consecutive terms overwhelmingly.

Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair were two British leaders who will mark the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries with their decision-making policies and with the results that these policies had not only in Britain but in the world stage.

## ***Divergences***

The first difference we can find in both leaders is related to their ideologies. Thatcher herself gave the name to what we know as “Thatcherism”, but we cannot talk about “Blairism”. Thatcher followed a strong and firm ideology to reform her party and her nation. We cannot say the same in the case of Blair. Although he based his policy on the Third Way, it is not a strong ideology. In fact during his terms in office he looked for an ideology which defined his policy-making. We find in it lack of coherence and authentic firm ideas.

They were both excellent speakers, but Thatcher identified herself with the discourse she represented. In decisive moments in which she had to take drastic and radical decisions she was firm and she carried them out till the end.

Blair had something that Thatcher lacked. He had a great charm. He captivated the masses as few politicians could do. Blair knew what people wanted to hear. Thatcher lacked that talent. But Blair did not show the confidence in his policy-making as Thatcher did.

Blair believed in consensus, in flexible policies. Thatcher thought that the consensus period, when social welfare was uppermost, was over. It was the time for reorganization in every aspect of British life.

At the beginning of her first term, the Iron Lady was not interested in foreign policy. She considered that Britain and its precarious position were more important. Unlike Thatcher, Blair, although with no experience in foreign policy, felt fascinated about the multiple possibilities that foreign issues and the world stage could offer. Furthermore, along with progressive politicians such as Clinton or Romano Prodi, Blair organized a great amount of seminars and meetings in which they analyzed social problems and what the Third Way tried to reflect in society.

It is in the European question where we find the most important differences. Thatcher felt a complete aversion to Europe. It was inconceivable the idea of Britain's dependence on Europe and a possible loss in the power of her institutions and, of course, the danger of a single currency. A possible

cooperation with European bureaucrats was impossible for her. She had continuous clashes with her European counterparts, as was the case of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Britain was considered the awkward partner of the European Community. Britain was unwilling to compromise and to yield power to a Central European government. But above all, the key factor in her fight against Europe was the unresolved question about Britain's budgetary contributions. She always demanded more in the rebate contribution, something which countries like France were not willing to accept.

Blair was more flexible in his ideas towards foreign and European policies. He thought that Europe could offer improvements in the British economy and in social policies. He even sought a leading role in Europe but the British rejection of the single currency and the Iraq war made this fact impossible.

Blair achieved a better relationship with Europe. During his premiership Britain and Europe carried out many common policies and improvements in the welfare state. An important fact was that during Blair's leadership Britain was seen as a normal E.U. member, not as the "dirty man" of Europe. He achieved important deals with certain European leaders. But the most important achievement was that Britain was able to make deals with Europe and to have an almost stable relation. It is true that Blair had to do certain concessions which Thatcher would have never allowed. In spite of the good relationship with Europe, Blair did not enter in the Eurozone. He preferred not to take the risk. Elections weighed more than the single currency.

Margaret Thatcher developed her social and economic policies following the New Right ideas, ideas which were shared by her American counterpart president Ronald Reagan. Tax cuts, budget increased in defense, law and order were some of the key points in the New Right ideology.

As regards foreign affairs, the hard relationship with Europe, the end of the Cold War and the "special relationship" with America are the main points we have to mention.

Europe meant the constant idea of dependence on the Old Continent and the loss of sovereignty. Many thinkers believe that her resistance to link her policies with those of the EEC in order to keep a more flexible policy with her European partners was a complete mistake for Britain. The farther she moved from Europe the closer she was towards America. Her idea of a renewed Britain was absolutely joined with America and its influence was necessary.

This “special relationship” would mark Thatcher’s government in many aspects, not only in certain conflicts in which both countries, the U.S. and the U.K. intervened but in the former relationship between USSR and North America.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin wall was one of the most important events in the twentieth century and Thatcher played an essential role here. The fall of Communism was one of the main ideas Thatcher and Reagan pursued with great effort. So, it is true that Thatcher began a period of great changes, changes which Blair inherited and developed during his terms in office.

Tony Blair took the wheel of the government in 1997 after seventeen years of Conservative governments. His decade in foreign policy was turbulent. Blair’s great failure was the Iraq conflict but he also achieved certain successes. His humanitarian interventionism in Bosnia was a success. He tried to put in his agenda important and necessary issues such as Africa, climate change and the peace process in the Middle East. His fight for the development of the Israeli-Palestinian road map ended in a complete failure, but his efforts for a positive outcome were huge.

Those who saw 9/11 events in New York and Washington on TV thought that many things would change from that moment on. But although our world is rather different than it was in the aftermath of the Cold war or at the turn of the millennium, the changes have not been so huge as we first thought. The international landscape has been redefined and the global economy has been altered but we still live in an unsafe world, with too many wars in many countries and the terrorism threat still produces a latent discontent in our society.

As we said before, the Bosnian conflict ended in a moderate and reasonable success but this was not the case of the Iraq conflict. Western intervention in this conflict was ambiguous, the search for democracy was not so clear, even today. Blair could have become the bridge between Europe and the U.S. but the war on terror forced him to make a choice. His completely agreement and support to Bush increased Blair's image of "poodleism".



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